Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy
. . . this book is recommended for all college libraries. W.S. Curran, Choice . . . this is a very useful and informative text which provides an integrated account of the main theoretical and practical aspects of antitrust policy. It should be of value to anyone with an interest in this area of economic policy. David Young, The Economic Journal Whether for an academic or practitioner, lawyer or economist, I know of no single volume on the subject that is more comprehensive and useful than the one Utton has given us. C.G. Krouse, International Journal of the Economics of Business Market dominance encompassing single firm dominance, overt and tacit collusion mergers and vertical restraints raises many complex analytical and policy issues. All have been subjected recently to close theoretical scrutiny and policy development, especially within the European Union, as well as extensive discussion in the news media following a number of widely reported cases. Written by a leading authority in the field, Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy combines an analysis of the issues with a discussion of the leading cases in the UK, EU and US. Areas covered include market dominance and the institutions used to deal with it, the market conduct of dominant firms, and the relationship between firms and their suppliers or distributors. The concluding section deals with a number of controversial and unresolved questions including possible conflicts between trade and antitrust policy, the foreign ownership of domestic assets, extra-territorial claims by some countries and the apparent inadequacy of antitrust remedies. This book will be welcomed by students, researchers and policymakers as an important, up-to-date review and analysis of both the theoretical and policy problems associated with market dominance.
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action agreement allocative allowed analysis anti-dumping antitrust authorities antitrust laws antitrust policy argued Article 85 brand cartel cent Chapter collusion Commission competition competitors concentration concerned consumer surplus consumers context customers dead weight loss decision DGFT discussed distribution distributors dominant firm dominant position economic effect efficiency elasticity entry barriers entry conditions example exclusive dealing Figure firm's horizontal mergers important incentive increase incumbent firm industry infringement innovation input involved issue Lerner index manufacturer marginal cost marginal revenue market conduct market dominance market power market share market structure merger policy monopolist monopoly price oligopoly operate output particular possible potential entrants practice predatory pricing price discrimination provisions public interest purchase referred Regulation rent seeking resale price maintenance restriction result retail rivals Section sell Sherman Act significant strategic behaviour strategy substantial supplier supply Supreme Court trade vertical integration vertical mergers vertical restraints welfare loss X-inefficiency