Mind, Volume 9 (Google eBook)
George Croom Robertson, George Frederick Stout
Basil Blackwell, 1884 - Electronic journals
A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind.
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abstract action activity admit agent animal Animal Intelligence appear apperception Aristotle bodily Bruno called cause classification cognition complete conception connexion consciousness corresponding definite deux distinction doctrine effect elements emotion ethical evolution existence experience expression external fact feeling function Green Hegel Hinton human Hume hypnotic idea identical illusions implies individual inference instance intellectual intelligence J. S. Mill judgment Kant Kantian knowledge Leibniz less logical matter means meme ment mental metaphysical method mind moral movement nature notion object observed onomatopoeia organism pain particular perception pheno phenomena philosophy physical Plato position possible present principle priori probably Prof proposition psychical psychology question realisation reality reason recognised reflex reflex action regard relation result scientific seems sensation sense Spencer Spinoza suppose synthetical propositions theory things thought tion Transcendentalism Transcendentalists true truth Umbris universal whole word
Page 543 - Euclid's, and show by construction that its truth was known to us ; to demonstrate, for example, that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal...
Page 194 - What kind of an emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible for me to think.
Page 5 - We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold.
Page 13 - It is a gap that is intensely active. A sort of wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a given direction, making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness, and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term. If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit into its mould. And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap of another, all empty of content as both might seem necessarily to be when described...
Page 178 - All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist; Not its semblance but itself; no beauty, nor good nor power Whose voice has gone forth, but each survives for the melodist When eternity affirms the conception of an hour. The high that proved too high, the heroic for earth too hard...
Page 264 - Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos, " Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno, •' Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant, 750 " Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti.
Page 190 - Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect...
Page 193 - If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff...
Page 3 - The resting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be held before the mind for an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; the places of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest. Let us call the resting-places the "substantive parts," and the places of flight the "transitive parts,