Coordination and Incentive Contracts in Stochastic Project Management

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University of California, Los Angeles, 2005 - Project management - 254 pages

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Contents

Resource Allocation in Projects with Stochastic Activity Dura
6
References
37
References
80
Copyright

1 other sections not shown

Common terms and phrases

activity durations af2 afi afi af2 ANGELES OF CALIFORN ANGELES THE UNIVERSITY asymmetric information beta distributions c₁ c₂ CALIFORN OF CALIFORN CALIFORN THE UNIVERSITY CALIFORNIA concave constraints cost of effort CTMC decrease distributed random variables E-LIBRARY Elmaghraby expected profit expected project duration exponentially distributed Əh₂ Əh Əhi Əki FB FB fixed-price contracts function high mid mid hypoexponential distribution incentive contracting problem IR constraints Journal of Operational k₁ low high mid Medium 01 High Medium c1 mid low high mid mid low mid mid mid moral hazard MTTA normally distributed OF-CALIFORN Operational Research optimal contract optimal effort levels optimal linear contract parallel Payment to Agent principal's profit project manager project network r₁ random variables resource allocation risk aversion solution stochastic sub-projects subcontractors task duration time-cost trade-off UBRARY UNIVERSITY LOS ANGELES UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORN X₁ θμι λι μ₁ μ₂ Σ Σ дев

Bibliographic information

TitleCoordination and Incentive Contracts in Stochastic Project Management
AuthorMurat Bayiz
PublisherUniversity of California, Los Angeles, 2005
Original fromthe University of California
DigitizedMar 16, 2011
Length254 pages
  
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