The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan"The Limits of Liberty is concerned mainly with two topics. One is an attempt to construct a new contractarian theory of the state, and the other deals with its legitimate limits. The latter is a matter of great practical importance and is of no small significance from the standpoint of political philosophy."—Scott Gordon, Journal of Political Economy James Buchanan offers a strikingly innovative approach to a pervasive problem of social philosophy. The problem is one of the classic paradoxes concerning man's freedom in society: in order to protect individual freedom, the state must restrict each person's right to act. Employing the techniques of modern economic analysis, Professor Buchanan reveals the conceptual basis of an individual's social rights by examining the evolution and development of these rights out of presocial conditions. |
Contents
Commencement | 1 |
The Bases for Freedom in Society | 17 |
Postconstitutional Contract The Theory of Public Goods | 35 |
Constitutional Contract The Theory of Law | 53 |
Continuing Contract and the Status Quo | 74 |
The Paradox of Being Governed | 91 |
Law As Public Capital | 107 |
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accept agreed-on agreement alternative analysis anarchistic anarchy attained becomes benefits budget budgetary bureaucratic Calculus of Consent ceteris paribus Chapter claims coalitions collective action collective decisions conceptual conflict constitutional contract constraints contractarian costs decision-making defined dilemma discussion economic economists effective efficiency embodied emerge enforcing agent equilibrium ethical example exchange exist expected value external formal genuine Gordon Tullock governmental Hobbesian ideal imposed independently individual rights initial institutions interaction involves Knut Wicksell large numbers law violation legal structure Leviathan limits majority ment modern mutual natural distribution nomic norms observed outcomes participants parties persons political politicians position potential precepts predicted preferred problem produce projects property rights public bad Public Choice public-goods punishment rational recognize relatively respect restrictions role secure sense shift social contract social order society specific status quo suggests theory tion trade two-person unanimity utility loss vidual Wicksellian