penetrabile. Est enim e Galliis venientibus prona humilitate devexum, pendentium saxorum altrinsecus visu terribile, præsertim verno tempore: cum liquente gelu, nivibusque solutis flatu calidiore ventorum, per diruptas utrinque angustias, et lacunas pruinarum congerie latebrosas, descendentes cunctantibus plantis homines et jumenta procidunt et carpenta; idque remedium ad arcendum exitium repertum est solum, quod pleraque vehicula vastis funibus illigata, pone cohibente virorum vel boum nisu valido, vix gressu reptante paullo tutius devolvuntur. Et hæc, ut diximus, anni verno contingunt. Hieme vero humus crustata frigoribus, et tanquam levigata, ideoque labilis, incessum præcipitantem impellit, et patulæ valles per spatia plana glacie perfidæ vorant nonnunquam transeuntes. Ob quæ locorum callidi eminentes ligneos stilos per cautiora loca defigunt, ut eorum series viatorem ducat innoxium: qui si nivibus operti latuerint, montanis defluentibus rivis eversi, agrestibus præviis difficile pervaduntur. A summitate autem hujus Italici clivi, planities adusque stationem nomine Martis (Oulx) per septem extenditur millia: et hinc alia celsitudo erectior, ægreque superabilis, at Matronæ porrigitur verticem (Mont Genèvre), cujus vocabulum casus fœminæ nobilis dedit.1 Unde declive quidem iter, sed expeditius, adusque castellum Virgantiam (Briançon) patet."

The latter part of this passage is easily understood; and the plain, said to be seven M. P. in length, is the level valley which extends for nearly that distance from Oulx towards Susa. Yet the rest of the description, which I have marked by italics, would not be verified in the narrow valley or ravine, which extends from the eastern extremity of the planities to Susa; but it would be an accurate picture of the descent from the Mont Cenis, while from the summit of the Italian declivity of the Cenis another plain of about seven M. P. in length extends to the Col of the Little

As in the case of the Plan des Dames on the Bonhomme.

Mont Cenis. I am inclined to think that Ammianus had received accounts both of the Mont Cenis and the Mont Genèvre, and confounded the plateau of the Mont Cenis with the level valley below Oulx, so as to make two passes into one. The error in the Peutingerian Table is partly of the same nature, and may be owing to a similar misconception. The constructor of that table seems to have confounded the Alpes Cottic with the Alpis Cottia, and thus to have made all the Cottian routes meet on the Genèvre. For the Mons Gaura, though not in the Cottian Land, may be considered as belonging to that division of the Alps which is called the 'Cottian,' rather than to the 'Graian' or 'Maritime' Alps; and the route by the Genèvre and the Mons Gaura is, in point of fact, called in the Antonine Itinerary, Iter a Mediolano per Alpes Cottias Viennam.

APPENDIX.

1. On the word 'Leucopetron.'

EXCEPT in the account of Hannibal's march through the Alps, there is only one passage in Polybius where this word occurs, and here it seems nearly equivalent to our English word crag. I have given below at length the narrative of Polybius where Leucopetron is thus found for the second time, as the account helps to shew the nature of mountain warfare, and to illustrate the story of the battle fought by Hannibal, when he eventually encamped "near a certain strong Leucopetron," to protect the march of his army. In my Treatise on Hannibal's Passage of the Alps I have identified this Leucopetron with the Rock of Baune, a crag about a mile long, and perhaps 500 feet high, which completely bars the valley near St. Michel in the Maurienne. The Rock of Baune, and the Rock of Esseillon (ante, p. 42, note) which strikes the eye of every traveller, are the two great λευκόπετρα ὀχυρά of that valley.

The passage in Polybius which I now subjoin is found in lib. x. cap. 29, 30, and relates to an expedition of King Antiochus. It runs thus:

"Antiochus therefore determined to march into Hyrcania. But when he came to Tagæ, and learned from the inhabitants the difficult nature of the country that he would have to pass through till he reached the summit of Mount Labus which declines towards Hyrcania, and also the numbers of the Barbarians who beset in places the difficult passes (Taîs dvoxwplais αὐτοῦ), he determined to divide his unencumbered men (τὸ τῶν εὐζώνων πλos), and to distribute them under their leaders, so as to be ready to act upon any emergency. In like manner also he arranged the pioneers (TOÙS XELTOUPYOÚS), who were to accompany the unencumbered men, and prepare any place which these had taken possession of for the passage of the phalangites and the baggage-animals. Having thus resolved, he gave

the command of the van to Diogenes, placing under him archers and slingers, and such of the mountaineers as were able to hurl darts and stones: these fought without order, but were of the greatest service in the difficult passes, by always being ready for the attack individually whenever the time and place required it. Next in order were placed about two thousand Cretans with bucklers, under the command of Polyxenidas the Rhodian. Last came those armed with breastplates and with shields, who were commanded by Nicomedes the Coan and Nicolaus the Ætolian.

As they proceeded on their march, the ruggedness and narrowness of the passes were found to be much greater than the king had anticipated. For the whole length of the ascent (Tĥs avaßáσews) was about three hundred stadia; and for the greater part of this distance they were obliged to make their way through a deep ravine traversed by a mountain-torrent, and where the passage was impeded by trees and by many rocks which had fallen into it from the precipices above. These impediments were also much increased by the Barbarians: for they made a series of barricades by felling the trees, and piled up quantities of great stones, while they themselves remained on the watch, having occupied all along the gorge the commanding eminences, where they might likewise be in safety. In this manner, had they not committed an oversight, they would have forced Antiochus to abandon an attempt which he would have been entirely unable to accomplish: for they made their preparations and occupied their posts on this supposition, that their enemies would be absolutely obliged to effect their ascent through the ravine itself. Yet they did not perceive, on the other hand, that it was indeed impossible for the phalanx and the baggage to pass in any other manner than they had anticipated, for these were unable to gain the slopes of the mountains; whereas an ascent among the crags themselves (ἡ δι ̓ αὐτῶν τῶν λευκοπέτρων αναβολή) was not impracticable for the light-armed and unencumbered. And thus, when the first posts of the Barbarians were reached by the troops of Diogenes, who were making their ascent outside the ravine (i. e. on the slopes above, not in or near the bed of the torrent), the aspect of affairs was changed. For, as they saw at once from the nature of the case what was to be done in such circumstances, they struck obliquely up the mountains and thus got above their enemies, severely galling them by incessant showers of darts and close volleys of stones, and harassing them especially with their slings from a distance. When they had thus driven the Barbarians away and taken possession of their posts, the pioneers had time to clear the obstacles in the passage entirely away, and to smooth the road in safety: and this was soon done on account of their great number. In this manner, as the slingers, the archers, and the dartmen, advanced along the heights dispersedly, but gathering together at times and seizing the commanding positions ; and as the men with bucklers guarded the march, and advanced in regular order and march through the ravine; the barbarians did not stay to hold their ground, but all, abandoning their positions, collected on the summit of the pass."

The circumstances of Antiochus appear to have been more favourable than those of Hannibal. Antiochus anticipated an attack on his van, and made preparations to resist it accordingly. Hannibal expected an attack on his rear, was prepared to resist it, and repelled it. But he was also attacked on his flank (and I think unexpectedly) in the van; as Antiochus would have been, had he not previously dislodged the Barbarians. Both would probably have dislodged the Barbarians on the heights in a similar manner, but with a rather different result. Antiochus outflanked the Barbarians in their posts, getting above them; and thus obliged them to retreat up the valley, and not higher up the side of the mountain where the contest took place. Hannibal seems to have got in like manner above the posts of the Barbarians, but after they had left them and retreated higher up the mountain on the side of the valley, instead of up the valley itself. Thus the subsequent operations were different. The light troops of Antiochus proceeded up the valley, along the mountains, continually dislodging the Barbarians, and thus protecting their own army in the valley below. Hannibal, having the Barbarians partly above him on his flank, and partly behind him hanging on his rear, encamped, instead of marching, in a kind of semi-circle round the Leucopetron, kept off in this manner the Barbarians from the more defenceless part of his army, and allowed it to march on ahead. It may be asked, why Hannibal did not advance along the flanks of the mountains, and why the Barbarians did not thus proceed oftener, so as to hover over the Carthaginian army, as it marched on through the valley. The precipitous character of the Alps may have rendered this in general impracticable.

It may be thought that the Rock of Baune is too near the summit of the Little Mont Cenis to mark the limit of Hannibal's progress on the fourth night of his march from the town of the Allobroges (Allevard). For that rock is about 50 Roman miles from Allevard, and hardly 35 from the plateau of the Little Mont Cenis, which would have been gained on the morning of the ninth day. Hannibal would consequently have marched to the Rock at the rate of 13 miles a-day, and from it to the summit of the pass at not more than 8. But several considerations make this difference probable.