Rational Choice Politics, Volume 1
The formal modeling techniques of rational choice theory have become central to the discipline of political science, for example with regard to the understanding of the working of legislatures, coalition governments, executive-bureaucracy relations, or electoral systems. The collection includes the very best work in this field, as well as an editors' introduction to each volume that describes the importance of the articles and their place in political science.
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Appendix of Sources
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agenda alternatives amendment American Political Science approval voting Arrow Arrow's theorem assume assumption bargaining bliss points candidates characterize closed rule coalition committee concave Condorcet continuation value convex convex set core decision problem defined denote density dimension dimensional distribution Duverger's Law Econometrica Economic election Euclidean example exists Ferejohn Figure finite follows game form hemicontinuous Hence hyperplane ideal points implies indifference curve indifferent individual institutions Journal of Political least legislative legislature Lemma majority rule manipulability McKelvey median voter member recognized min-max majority min-max point mixed strategy motion multidimensional Nash Nash equilibrium open rule paper party Plott policy outcome policy space Political Science politicians position preference ordering procedure Proof proposal Proposition pure strategy quasi-concave result satisfying session Shepsle simple majority sincere voting single-peaked social choice solution stationary equilibrium subgame subset Theorem theory total median tuple uncovered set utility functions vector voting rule voting scheme winning