Institutions and monetary policy: credibility, flexibility, and central bank independence
. . . a rigorous and scholarly analysis of the nature of central bank independence (CBI). Luckily for the non-mathematical reader, there are clear explanations, laying out the argument that is developed in fully worked mathematical models: but much is strictly for the technically competent. Central Banking Central bank independence is a key issue for political and monetary authorities in many countries. In Institutions and Monetary Policy, Eric Schaling looks at the impact of different central banks on price stability and macroeconomic performance, and their optimal degree of legislative independence. After introducing and surveying the rules versus discretion debate in monetary policy, Eric Schaling then investigates the relationship between domestic monetary institutions and macroeconomic performance. The author compares central bank independence in twelve industrial countries Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Switzerland and prepares an index of his results. The relationship between central bank independence, inflation and output growth is extensively discussed and a series of propositions tested for the same set of countries over the period from 1972 to 1991. Normative issues are investigated in the later part of the book including the optimal degree of central bank independence in relation to, first, the inflation rate and, second, wage formation in a totally unionized economy. Institutions and Monetary Policy will be welcomed by scholars and policymakers concerned with the increasingly important role of institutions in monetary policy and the relation between degrees of central bank independence and political and economic outcomes.
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Central Bank Independence in Twelve Industrial Countries
Theory and Evidence
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Alesina appointed average inflation Backus and Driffill bank's Banque de France Barro and Gordon Board central bank independence central bank laws Chapter constant money Cukierman 1992 deadweight loss degree of central demand Deutsche Bundesbank dynamic inconsistency economic independence effect of inflation equation equilibrium expected inflation Federal Reserve fiscal policy fully discretionary regime Governor Hence higher independent central bank indices of central inflation rate inflation stabilization inflationary bias Kydland level of inflation Lohmann loss function lower Masciandaro and Tabellini monetary policy monetary regime monetary stability money supply money supply rule natural rate nominal income rule nominal wage optimal degree output growth parameter period Phillips curve policy game policy independence policymaker political price stability Proposition rate of inflation rate of unemployment rational expectations real wage Rogoff Section seigniorage Substituting supply shocks supply side effect trade-off union variance wage setters zero inflation
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Macroeconomia Financeira II - Crises financeiras e regulação monetária
No preview available - 2004