The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory

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Cambridge University Press, Apr 13, 1999 - Computers - 268 pages
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This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utitlity theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a "representation theorem" that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. In providing the most complete and robust defense of causal decision theory the book will be of interest to a broad range of readers in philosophy, economics, psychology, mathematics, and artificial intelligence.
  

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Contents

Instrumental Rationality as Expected Utility
9
Decision Problems
48
Savages Theory
78
Evidential Decision Theory
114
Causal Decision Theory
146
A General Theory of Conditional Beliefs
181
A Representation Theorem for Causal
224
Where Things Stand
252
References
258
Index
265
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The Nature of Normativity
Ralph Wedgwood
No preview available - 2007
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About the author (1999)

Joyce is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan.

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