The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military MightPublisher description: Successful coercion should be relatively simple for the United States. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States is without rivals in military might, political influence, or economic strength. Yet despite the lopsided US edge in raw power, regional foes persist in defying the threats and ultimatums brought by the United States and its allies. This book examines why some attempts to strong-arm an adversary work while others do not. It explores how coercion today differs from coercion during the Cold War. It describes the constraints on the United States emanating from the need to work within coalitions and the restrictions imposed by domestic politics, and it assesses the special challenges likely to arise when an adversary is a non-state actor or when the use of weapons of mass destruction is possible. |
Contents
The theory of coercion | 30 |
Measuring coercion | 31 |
key analytic concepts | 37 |
The path ahead | 46 |
Coercive mechanisms | 48 |
Commonly used mechanisms | 50 |
Secondorder coercion | 82 |
Conclusion | 85 |
Limits imposed by coalitions | 158 |
Coalitions and adversary countercoercion | 171 |
Conclusion | 172 |
Humanitarian coercion and nonstate actors | 175 |
Humanitarian intervention and coercion | 176 |
The decision to intervene | 177 |
Common tasks during a humanitarian intervention | 181 |
Constraints on humanitarian coercion | 183 |
Coercive instruments | 87 |
Air strikes | 88 |
Invasions and land grabs | 99 |
The threat of nuclear attack | 102 |
Sanctions and international isolation | 105 |
Support for an insurgency | 117 |
Combinations | 120 |
Conclusion | 123 |
THE CONTEXT OF COERCION TODAY | 125 |
Domestic politics and coercion | 130 |
Justifying force | 132 |
US casualty sensitivity | 134 |
Sensitivity to adversary civilian suffering | 137 |
US political constraints and adversary countercoercion | 142 |
The asymmetry of constraints | 148 |
Conclusion | 150 |
Coercion and coalitions | 152 |
Why coalitions? | 154 |
The challenge of nonstate adversaries | 190 |
Nonstate actors and countercoercion | 194 |
Conclusion | 199 |
Weapons of mass destruction and US coercion | 201 |
Understanding the danger | 203 |
WMD and escalation dominance | 212 |
how WMD use affects coercion | 216 |
Implications for coercive contests | 218 |
Conclusion | 224 |
THE FUTURE OF US COERCION | 227 |
Challenges to strategy making | 229 |
Why policy makers and analysts disagree | 234 |
Coercion dynamics and credibility traps | 236 |
Final words | 239 |
Bibliography | 241 |
| 265 | |
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The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military ... Daniel Byman,Matthew Waxman No preview available - 2002 |
Common terms and phrases
adversary's air campaign air power air strikes arsenal Bombing to Win Bosnian Serb brute force chapter coalition members coerce coercer coercion Coercive Diplomacy coercive instruments coercive strategies coercive threats Cold War collateral damage concessions conflict constraints context costs credibility crises crisis decision makers defense denial Deterrence diplomatic domestic political Economic Sanctions effects efforts elite escalation dominance foes foreign policy Gulf Hezbollah inflict insurgency International Iraq Iraq's Iraqi Israel Israeli Janice Gross Stein Kosovo leaders leadership limited massive mechanisms military forces Milosevic missile Mueller NATO nonstate actors North Korea nuclear weapons Operation Allied Force Operation Deliberate Force options Palestinian Pape planners population potential power base RAND regime regime's regional response risk rules of engagement Rwanda Saddam Serbia Somalia Soviet successful coercion targets threaten tion U.S. air U.S. and allied U.S. casualties U.S. forces U.S. military U.S. policy makers U.S. public United University Press unrest Vietnam Washington York