Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years (Google eBook)
Rand Corporation, Jun 28, 2011 - 26 pages
A core finding of previous RAND research on 30 years of insurgencies worldwide was that a conflict's overall score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad counterinsurgency factors and practices perfectly predicted the ultimate outcome. Using the scorecard approach and an expert elicitation (Delphi) exercise, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011.
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12 bad factors 30 historical 30 insurgencies 4.5 bad factors Afghan government Afghanistan Delphi Exercise Afghanistan in early allies rely area of conflict assessments Beth Grill Christopher Paul claims to control COIN force establishes COIN force perceived COIN force realizes COIN forces effectively collateral damage collective punishment controlled or claimed Croatia Delphi Method discussion Early 2011 Afghanistan effectively disrupt insurgent eight good factors expands secure areas factors and minimize factors or practices factors present force and government force or government forces effectively disrupt half-point improvement ISAF looting for sustainment maximize good factors minority positions mountebanks operations in Afghanistan participants were asked peanuts perception of security phases population in area present or absent Primary COIN force RAND Afghanistan Delphi RAND Corporation raw average realizes at least rely on looting Santa Monica scorecard factors Sources of Success strategic communication factors substantial new grievances Success in Counterinsurgency think tanks Thousand Fathers women’s rights