Predicting currency fluctuations and crises: do resident firms have an informational advantage?
Daniel Kaufmann, Gil Mehrez, Sergio L. Schmukler, World Bank Institute. Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division
World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance, Regulation, and Finance, 1999 - Business & Economics - 34 pages
Markets have had limited success predicting crises and might do better by drawing on private information available to resident enterprise managers, who seem to know better than markets about future movements in exchange rates.
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