## Evolution and the Theory of GamesIn this 1982 book, the theory of games, first developed to analyse economic behaviour, is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy is relevant whenever the best thing for an animal or plant to do depends on what others are doing. The theory leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns. This book contains a full account of the theory, and of the data relevant to it. The account is aimed at senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and research workers in animal behaviour, population genetics and evolutionary biology. The book will also be of interest to mathematicians and game theorists; the mathematics has been largely confined to appendixes so that the main text may be easily followed by biologists. |

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - amarcobio - LibraryThingThis is a classic text. The first chapters nicely introduces Game Theory in evolutionary biology. the remaining chapters develop different types of games and, in my opinion, these are not as good as the first ones. Anyhow, it is a great read. Read full review

#### Review: Evolution and the Theory of Games

User Review - Shahab - Goodreadsgonna read it for presenting that leaflet for the "special topics in physics"... all the ideas and concepts of it seem confusing and intresting...:) Read full review

### Contents

Introduction | 1 |

The basic model | 10 |

A The HawkDove game | 11 |

B A review of the assumptions | 20 |

C An extended model pitying the field | 23 |

The war of attrition | 28 |

Games with genetic models | 40 |

B Phenotypes concerned with sexual reproduction | 43 |

Life history strategies and the size game | 140 |

Honesty bargaining and commitment | 147 |

A Information transfer in animal contests | 148 |

B Bluff as a transitory phenomenon | 151 |

D Commitment | 161 |

The evolution of cooperation | 167 |

Postscript | 174 |

Appendixes | 180 |

C The evolution of anisogamy | 47 |

Learning the ESS | 54 |

Mixed strategies I A classification of mechanisms | 68 |

Mixed strategies II Examples | 81 |

B Status in flocks | 82 |

C Dimorphic males | 86 |

D Ideal free distributions | 90 |

E Dispersal in a uniform environment | 92 |

Asymmetric games I Ownership | 94 |

Asymmetric games II A classification and some illustrative examples | 106 |

Asymmetric games III Sex and generation games | 123 |

B Parental care | 126 |

C Games with cyclical dynamics | 130 |

D Sexual selection | 131 |

E Games with alternate moves | 137 |

C The BishopCannings theorem | 182 |

D Dynamics and stability | 183 |

E Retaliation | 188 |

F Games between relatives | 191 |

G The war of attrition with random rewards | 194 |

H The ESS when the strategy set is defined by one or more continuous variables | 197 |

I To find the ESS from a set of recurrence relations | 198 |

J Asymmetric games with cyclic dynamics | 199 |

K The reiterated Prisoners Dilemma | 202 |

Explanation of main terms | 204 |

205 | |

215 | |

222 | |

### Common terms and phrases

Agelenopsis aggressive analysed anisogamy Appendix arise asexual assumption Asymmetric games attrition behaviour Bishop-Cannings theorem Bluffer breeding burrow chapter choice choose consider cooperate cost defect discussed display dominant eggs equal equations equilibrium escalated contest ESS's evolution evolutionarily stable evolutionary game theory evolve example external fertilisation favour female preference fertilisation fights Figure fish follows frequency-dependent game-theoretic gametes genes genetic models genetic polymorphism genotype habitat Harris sparrow Hawk Hawk and Dove Hawk-Dove game Hence inclusive fitness individuals adopting intruder invade isogamy male mating Maynard Smith mixed ESS mixed strategy mutant natural selection offspring opponent owner ownership pair pairwise contests Parker particular payoff matrix phenotype phenotype set playing plumage population possible Prisoner's Dilemma probability problem produce pure strategies reproduction resource role sex ratio sexual shown in Table signal species stable strategy stags strategy set subordinate success suppose territory theoretical uninvadable variable war of attrition wasps zygote