Evolution and the Theory of Games

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Cambridge University Press, Oct 21, 1982 - Science - 224 pages
3 Reviews
In this 1982 book, the theory of games, first developed to analyse economic behaviour, is modified so that it can be applied to evolving populations. John Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy is relevant whenever the best thing for an animal or plant to do depends on what others are doing. The theory leads to testable predictions about the evolution of behaviour, of sex and genetic systems, and of growth and life history patterns. This book contains a full account of the theory, and of the data relevant to it. The account is aimed at senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and research workers in animal behaviour, population genetics and evolutionary biology. The book will also be of interest to mathematicians and game theorists; the mathematics has been largely confined to appendixes so that the main text may be easily followed by biologists.
  

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User Review  - amarcobio - LibraryThing

This is a classic text. The first chapters nicely introduces Game Theory in evolutionary biology. the remaining chapters develop different types of games and, in my opinion, these are not as good as the first ones. Anyhow, it is a great read. Read full review

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Contents

Introduction
1
The basic model
10
A The HawkDove game
11
B A review of the assumptions
20
C An extended model pitying the field
23
The war of attrition
28
Games with genetic models
40
B Phenotypes concerned with sexual reproduction
43
Life history strategies and the size game
140
Honesty bargaining and commitment
147
A Information transfer in animal contests
148
B Bluff as a transitory phenomenon
151
D Commitment
161
The evolution of cooperation
167
Postscript
174
Appendixes
180

C The evolution of anisogamy
47
Learning the ESS
54
Mixed strategies I A classification of mechanisms
68
Mixed strategies II Examples
81
B Status in flocks
82
C Dimorphic males
86
D Ideal free distributions
90
E Dispersal in a uniform environment
92
Asymmetric games I Ownership
94
Asymmetric games II A classification and some illustrative examples
106
Asymmetric games III Sex and generation games
123
B Parental care
126
C Games with cyclical dynamics
130
D Sexual selection
131
E Games with alternate moves
137
C The BishopCannings theorem
182
D Dynamics and stability
183
E Retaliation
188
F Games between relatives
191
G The war of attrition with random rewards
194
H The ESS when the strategy set is defined by one or more continuous variables
197
I To find the ESS from a set of recurrence relations
198
J Asymmetric games with cyclic dynamics
199
K The reiterated Prisoners Dilemma
202
Explanation of main terms
204
References
205
Subject index
215
Author index
222
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