The Nature of Truth: An Essay |
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¹ Cf absolute abstract actual adequate affirmed angles appercipient character apprehended assertion assumption barely particular complete conceive conception concrete thinking consciousness constitute corre correspondence correspondence-notion criticism Descartes determinate meaning distinction elements endeavour error Euclidean Space experiencing expression external F. H. Bradley factor finite experience formulation G. E. Moore God's human knowledge idea ideal experience ideally complete identity independent individual infinite inner involves isolated judge judgement of perception judgement of science logical logical assertion logician manifest mediate ment mental Metaphysics modes Monad natura naturata nature of truth negative notion numerical system object philosophical possessed precisely problem psychical existents Psychology reality reciprocal recognized relation riences Russell scientific mind self-fulfilment sensation sense sentient side significant whole simple entity single judgement Spinoza structure Subjective Idealism system of judgements systematic coherence term theory of truth things thought timeless tion tree is green unalterable unity universal judgement whilst
Popular passages
Page 23 - It may be said — and this is, I believe, the correct view — that there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood ; that some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white...
Page 65 - Now there can be one and only one such experience : or only one significant whole, the significance of which is self-contained in the sense required. For it is absolute self-fulfilment, absolutely self-contained significance, that is postulated ; and nothing short of absolute individuality — nothing short of the completely whole experience — can satisfy this postulate. And human knowledge — not merely my knowledge or yours, but the best and fullest knowledge in the world at any stage of its...
Page 68 - We have been demanding all along," he says (p. 82), " an entire reversal of this attitude " (of starting from the actual). " In our view it is the Ideal which is solid and substantial and fully actual. The finite experiences are rooted in the Ideal. They share its actuality 1 and draw from it whatever being and conceivability they possess.
Page 111 - Who did you pass on the road?' the King went on, holding out his hand to the Messenger for some more hay. "Nobody, ' said the Messenger. "Quite right,' said the King: "this young lady saw him too. So of course Nobody walks slower than you.
Page 161 - And since all human discursive knowledge remains thought ' about ' an Other, any and every theory of the nature of truth must itself be ' about ' truth as its Other ; ie, the CoherenceNotion of truth on its own admission can never rise above the level of knowledge which at the best attains to the truth of correspondence.
Page 62 - Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole. A ' significant whole ' is an organised individual experience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled. Its organisation is the process of its self-fulfilment, and the concrete manifestation of its individuality.
Page 33 - And this doctrine must be held, for the same reasons, to be true of all other relations; relations do not have instances, but are strictly the same in all propositions in which they occur...
Page 113 - Euclid's, and show by construction that its truth was known to us ; to demonstrate, for example, that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal...
Page 23 - and ' Falsity ', in the only strict sense of the terms, are characteristics of 'Propositions'. Every Proposition, in itself and in entire independence of mind, is true or false ; and only Propositions can be true or false. The truth or falsity of a Proposition is, so to say, its flavour, which we must recognize, if we recognize it at all, immediately : much as we appreciate the flavour of pineapple or the taste of...
Page 73 - RELATIVE' TRUTH. BY HAROLD H. JOACHIM. § 1. THE view, which I wish to attack, may be put roughly as follows : Every judgment is either true or false, and what is true is true always and absolutely and completely.