Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings

Front Cover
MIT Press, 2004 - Psychology - 1023 pages
3 Reviews

Amos Tversky (1937--1996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his professional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally their systematic violation due to the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, and statistics.This book collects forty of Tversky's articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the last months of Tversky's life. It is divided into three sections: Similarity, Judgment, and Preferences. The Preferences section is subdivided into Probabilistic Models of Choice, Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, and Contingent Preferences. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman.

  

What people are saying - Write a review

User Review - Flag as inappropriate

Tversky is one of the fundamental thinkers in this field I have followed his writings ( not intensively ) Since the seminal article in Science in 1974 Judgement under Uncertainty, written with D. Kahneman

Contents

Editors Introductory Remarks
3
Additive Similarity Trees
47
Studies of Similarity
75
Weighting Common and Distinctive Features in Perceptual and
97
Nearest Neighbor Analysis of Psychological Spaces
129
On the Relation between Common and Distinctive Feature Models
171
Editors Introductory Remarks
189
Heuristics and Biases
203
An Analysis of Decision under Risk
549
On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies
583
Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice
621
Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under
645
Cumulative Representation of
673
Nonconsequential Reasoning and
703
A Cognitive Perspective
729
Weighing Risk and Uncertainty
747

The Conjunction Fallacy in
221
The Cold Facts about the Hot Hand in Basketball257
257
Statistical Reality or Cognitive Illusion?
269
Calibration Resolution
301
A Nonextensional Representation of Subjective
329
On the Belief That Arthritis Pain Is Related to the Weather
377
Editors Introductory Remarks
405
Suhst it ut ability and Similarity in Binary Choices
419
The Intransitivity of Preferences
435
A Theory of Choice
463
Preference Trees
493
Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
777
A BeliefBased Account of Decision under Uncertainty
795
SelfDeception and the Voters Illusion
825
Contingent Weighting in Judgment and Choice
845
Preference Reversals
875
Discrepancy between Medical Decisions for Individual Patients and for
887
Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of WellBeing
917
ReasonBased Choice
937
ContextDependence in Legal Decision Making
963
Amos Tverskys Complete Bibliography
995
Copyright

Common terms and phrases

References to this book

About the author (2004)

Eldar Shafir is Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University.

Bibliographic information