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Adam Smith agreement alternative analysis argument benefits Buchanan calculus Calculus of Consent chapter choice behavior choose classical liberal conceptually constitutional choice constitutional economics Constitutional Political constraints contractarian cooperative costs criticism David Gauthier deference defined discussion distinction distributional economists embodies emerge epistemic equilibrium ethical evaluation exist externality F. A. Hayek firms G. L. S. Shackle Gordon Tullock groups Hutt ideal implications increasing returns individual input institutional internal interpretation investment involves James John Rawls liberties limits majoritarian modified moral nexus nomics normative numbers observed outcomes Pareto participants parties payoff persons perspective players political economy politicized position potential predicted preferences production public choice rational choice rational ignorance reform regime relevant remains rent-seeking restrictions scientific sense set of rules shift social interaction solution strategy structure suggest theory tion tional tive trade utility maximization veil of ignorance voluntary exchanges welfare economics Wicksell Wicksellian
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Jerry Evensky - 1993 - The Journal of Economic Perspectives
William N Butos, Roger G Koppl - 1993 - Constitutional Political Economy
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VIKTOR J VANBERG - 2005 - Journal of Institutional Economics
JSTOR: The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order.
Books Published - Center for Study of Public Choice
The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order av Buchanan ...
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