The Failure of Antitrust and Regulation to Establish Competition in Long-Distance Telephone Services
MacAvoy shows how antitrust and regulation have failed to make long-distance markets competitive, to the detriment of consumers seeking prices in line with the costs of providing long-distance services.
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Intentions of Antitrust and Regulatory
Implementing Regulatory and Antitrust Policies
Concentration Levels and Service Provider
Testing for Competitiveness
Prospects for Competition under
Discount Plan Summary
Sensitivity Analysis of Prices and PriceCost
access charges Ameritech antitrust AT&T Communications AT&T MCI Sprint Bell operating companies California calling pattern CC Dkt commission Common Carrier costs from FCC customers decree Deregulation DISCOUNT CALLING PLANS discount plans divestiture Dominant Carriers Dominican Republic Economics estimated Federal Federal Communications Commission hereinafter hours per month HTL Telemanagement inbound WATS increased INDEX PRICES interexchange carriers interLATA markets interLATA services interstate intrastate Judge Greene long-distance carriers long-distance markets long-distance service MacAvoy Margin and HHI MARGIN AND MARKET Marginal costs Marginal costs based market concentration market share MCI and Sprint monopoly monthly fee night/weekend outbound WATS Pacific Telesis percent price cap Price per Minute price-cost margins Rates for Dominant rates from HTL regulation regulatory Report and Order residential revenues service markets settlement payments standard MTS subscribers switched Synchronous optical network TABLE tacit collusion Tariff F.C.C. tariffs Telecommunications telephone THEORETICAL MINIMUM PRICE toll service United Kingdom usage levels
Page 299 - United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.. 552 F. Supp 131 (DDC 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States. 460 US 1001 (1983).