Legal Reasoning and Political ConflictThe most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork (who champions the original understanding of the Constitution) to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 63
Page vii
... day , at least if those views do not contribute to the particular outcome . The judge's intense focus on concrete controversies leads participants in law toward a special approach , one that is especially well - adapted.
... day , at least if those views do not contribute to the particular outcome . The judge's intense focus on concrete controversies leads participants in law toward a special approach , one that is especially well - adapted.
Page viii
... approach , one that is especially well - adapted to a situation of fundamental social disagreement : considerable distrust of ambitious , large - scale theories . Ordinary courts are reluctant to traffic in abstrac- tions . Judges often ...
... approach , one that is especially well - adapted to a situation of fundamental social disagreement : considerable distrust of ambitious , large - scale theories . Ordinary courts are reluctant to traffic in abstrac- tions . Judges often ...
Page ix
... approach to the problem of social heterogeneity and disagreement : agreements on results and on low - level principles amid confusion or dissensus on large - scale theories . With these claims I hope , of course , to make a contribution ...
... approach to the problem of social heterogeneity and disagreement : agreements on results and on low - level principles amid confusion or dissensus on large - scale theories . With these claims I hope , of course , to make a contribution ...
Page 8
... approach to punishment based on " just desserts " —an approach that would rank criminal conduct in terms of severity . But different commissioners had very different views about how different crimes should be ranked . In these ...
... approach to punishment based on " just desserts " —an approach that would rank criminal conduct in terms of severity . But different commissioners had very different views about how different crimes should be ranked . In these ...
Page 9
... approach based on deterrence seemed no better than an approach based on just deserts . In these circumstances , what route did the Commission follow ? In fact the Commission abandoned large theories altogether . It adopted no gen- eral ...
... approach based on deterrence seemed no better than an approach based on just deserts . In these circumstances , what route did the Commission follow ? In fact the Commission abandoned large theories altogether . It adopted no gen- eral ...
Contents
| 3 | |
| 13 | |
Incompletely Theorized Agreements | 35 |
Analogical Reasoning | 62 |
Understanding and Misunderstanding the Rule of Law | 101 |
In Defense of Casuistry | 121 |
Without Reasons Without Rules | 136 |
Adapting Rules Privately and Publicly | 148 |
Interpretation | 167 |
Law and Politics | 191 |
Notes | 197 |
Index | 211 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstract affirmative action agree allow American analogical reasoning analogical thinking apply approach area of law argument Cambridge casuistry citizens claim common law complex constitutional law context course criminal decide decisions democratic depends disagreement discretion discrimination diverse Dworkin economic example fact factors free speech hard originalism idea important incompletely theorized agreements individual involve issues Jeremy Bentham John Rawls Joseph Raz judges judgments about particular judicial justice large-scale lawmaking lawyers least legal reasoning legal system legislative legislature limits literal low-level principles meaning ment moral officials ordinary originalist participants in law particular judgments particular outcomes Perhaps political possible precedent privately adaptable rules problem produce protection provision question reflective equilibrium regulation relevantly require role Ronald Dworkin rule of law rule-bound rules and rulelessness sense social Sometimes specific standards statutes statutory statutory interpretation substantive supra note Supreme Court surrogacy theory tion Toyota Camry understanding virtues
Popular passages
Page 73 - We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.
Page 116 - Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to •whom they will apply legislation arid thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon...
Page 2 - We think utility, or happiness, much too complex and indefinite an end to be sought, except through the medium of various secondary ends, concerning which there may be, and often is, agreement among persons who differ in their ultimate standard ; and about which there does, in fact, prevail a much greater unanimity among flunking persons than might be supposed from their diametrical divergence on the great questions of moral metaphys; ics.
Page 140 - cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.
Page 126 - Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the passage of this act it shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States...
Page 73 - It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Page 201 - Even this evil is productive of good. It prevents the degeneracy of government, and nourishes a general attention to the public affairs. I hold it, that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical.
Page 106 - The injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most stedfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err in saying that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our national character and interest from...
Page 95 - It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done before, may legally be done again : and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice, and the general reason of mankind. These, under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities, to justify the most iniquitous opinions, and the judges never fail of directing accordingly.