Lessons of War as Taught by the Great Masters and Others: Selected and Arranged from the Various Operations of War

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W.H. Allen & Company, 1870 - Military art and science - 565 pages

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Contents

Napoleons officers not having time to acquire the knowledge Inspiration in war 3 Mastering strategical combinations and tactical handling of troops
10
Experience and study of strategy
11
Study the first condition of practical success 8 First qualification for a generalinchief 12
12
First example of combined operations by the Archduke Charles
13
Character needed for a great general 15 10 10
15
Wellingtons practice of daily study
16
A General experienced but unversed in strategy
17
Jomini as to prejudices respecting the principles of war
18
Vital questions of war to States
19
Rivers and hill ranges when parallel to an advancing armys path
22
STRATEGY
23
Description of a theatre of
28
French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762
30
SECTION IV
36
Limits of the theatre of operations
42
PAR PAGE
43
PAR PAGE 27 Opportunities on the defensive 253
52
Selecting a zone
61
Theatre of German war 1866
62
Fitness of the theatre for the action of each of the three arms
68
Defensive operations of the Austrian army in 1866
104
PAR PAGE
108
Possession of Richmond when desired by the Federal government
109
Alexandria isolated by the British
114
Former opinion as to the number of fortresses
120
PAR PAGE 23 Conditions for a good system of defence
123
System of defence for Great Britain
124
Proposed defensive means for England
125
SECTION II
126
Objects for undertaking a siege
127
Causes for the third attempt to reduce Badajos
128
Earthworks of the defenders
129
Obstacles against which the besiegers had to contend
130
Ensuring the success of a siege
131
Position of the besieging force 10 Position for a besieging force inferior in numbers
132
Causes for the second siege of Badajos
133
SECTION III
134
Awaiting an enemy within lines
135
Attack of intrenchments
136
Positions when strategic
137
Their distance from the base of operations
139
Railways for the defence
145
15
152
Admiral Farraguts fleet passing the batteries at Vicksburg
156
39
162
44
166
Earth and sand batteries
169
Concentration of Fire
170
PAR PAGE
171
4
172
Use of torpedoes by the Austrians
177
Advantages of steam conferred on the defenders
183
PAR PAGE 6 Landing of Wellingtons army at the mouth of the Mondego river
186
First modern instance of landing in the face of an enemy
187
Departure of the British army for Egypt
189
The landing
191
Landing places selected
192
Results following the plans followed
193
MODERN INNOVATIONS
195
Influences on the use of railways for alleviating sufferings and shortening
201
PAR PAGE
204
Direction of invaders attack
210
Vigilance and object
213
Line to be preserved
214
Method adopted in the Prussian army for communicating orders
216
Advantages conferred on an army awaiting the attack
218
222243
222
Manoeuvring round a flank
229
PAR PAGE 27 Wellingtons use of the sixth division as a reserve at Salamanca
234
Taking the initiative in strategy and in tactics relative advantages and disadvantages
235
Obstacles to an attacking force may increase the effects of the fire on them
236
Direction of fire on the defensive and offensive
237
Skirmishers attacking artillery
238
Conditions for offensive and defensive battles
239
Battles dependent on the General and troops
240
Lateness in commencing the battle
241
Expected direction of attack at Königgrätz
242
PAR PAGE CAVALRY 244269
244
Numerical proportion
245
its moral effect
246
Qualities requisite for a cavalrygeneral
247
Ground at Zorndorf previously examined by Seydlitz
248
The squadron the unit
249
Heavy and light weights
250
Security conferred by cavalry
251
Incompleteness of British victories from deficiency
252
opinion of Wellington
253
Ambuscade of Blucher on retreat from Bautzen
254
Nonemployment of Austrian cavalry at Königgrätz
255
Holding squadrons in reserve 34 Defeat of French cavalry under Murat at Wachau
256
Neglect of English cavalry reserves during the Peninsula war
257
Gaining an enemys flank
258
Echelon Movements 39 Occasions when advantageous
259
Two lines of Prussian cavalry at ChâteauThierry
260
Formation of columns of attack
261
Marmonts preference
262
Lancers in the time of Cromwell
263
Cutting versus thrusting
264
58
265
The last reserve usually decisive
266
Form of Austrian cavalry attacks
267
Adoption of mounted rifles in North America
273
The offensive and defensive considered
277
Proportion of field artillery to the other arms
278
Numbers at Austerlitz and at Solferino
279
Field artillery organized in batteries
280
Light material and easy movement required
281
Flank fire of Prussian artillery at Königgrätz
282
Future association with infantry
283
More fully developing the mobility of field guns
284
Means of adaptation of Austrian batteries for the movements of cavalry
285
Reserve Artillery 30 Objects of batteries of position
286
Usual place of reserve artillery
287
Nature of fire against a deployed line
293
PAR PAGE 65 Concentration of artillery at Talavera
298
Adaptability for concentrating
299
Introduction of artillery masses at Boulogne
300
Effect produced by two English guns at the Alma
301
Siege Artillery 73 Object and equipment of siege artillery
302
Nature and number of pieces of ordnance
303
Opening fire from the batteries
304
Positions strengthened by field works
329
Skirmishers attacked at Redinha
332
A position oblique to the line of operation
338
19
349
5
351
PAR PAGE 18 Salient points for divisional guns
356
Connecting the reserves with the lines
357
Introduction of reserves by Napoleon
358
CHAPTER VI
359
Determining the decisive point
360
Objects of an offensive battle
361
The parallel order reinforced on one part of the line The oblique order Application of the oblique order at Leuthen 7 Obtaining the oblique order
362
Period of engaging with the refused wing
363
Suitable formation for the attack on a flank Continuity of the line 9 Object of refusing a wing
364
The perpendicular order
365
Echeloned on the centre
366
Salient formation of the Austrians at Prague
367
Examples of the convex and salient orders
368
The concave order
369
Attacking both flanks simultaneously
370
Turning manoeuvres and extending movements
371
Column of attack not employed by the allies at Austerlitz
372
Movements of Marmont and Wellington previous to the battle of Salamanca
373
Marmonts manoeuvre to prevent the retreat of his opponents
374
Wellingtons counterattack at Salamanca
375
Wellingtons character as a tactician established 33 Attempt to turn the right flank of the British at Inkerman
376
Positions intersected by obstacles
377
Utilizing a shallow stream
378
Nature of guns for covering changes
379
SECTION II
380
Napoleons design in the attack on La Haye Sainte
381
Echelon formation for the attack of a post
382
Importance of advanced posts
383
Method of defence employed by the Prussians and Austrians
384
Napoleons forced marches to the relief of Dresden
387
Prussian flank march on Waterloo
400
Lateral movements in a retreat
408
PAR PAGE 18 Replenishing stores and supplies
412
Retreats favourable before a languid enemy
413
Consequences to Moore and Wellington by the bridges at Mamilla and Polencia not being broken
414
The command of the rear guard
415
Protection afforded after Austerlitz by artillery
416
Positions taken up by the Austrian artillery
417
Pursuit by the Prussians
418
Soults retreat on Toulouse
419
Retreat of the English army under Sir John Moore on Corunna
420
Cause leading to the battle at Corunna
421
Losses on both sides
422
Reduced state of the Spaniards from want of food Beresfords resolution in holding his position and showing a confident front 38 Retreat of the Prussi...
423
Retreat of the English army from Quatre Bras on Waterloo
424
Hour at which the retirement commenced
425
Withdrawal of the 3rd Division from Quatre Bras
426
Conduct of pursuits
428
MINOR OPERATIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS
431
Direction of pursuit
432
The Archduke Charles on the theory of mountain warfare
437
PAR PAGE 5 Principles for selection of defensive points
441
Engagements within a defile
442
Tactical importance of a defile
443
Defending the passage with artillery
445
Passage of the Balkan by the Russians in 1829
446
The Pass of Somosierra forced by Napoleon
448
Attack on the Pass of Biar by the French
450
CHAPTER II
452
Passage of the Rhine in 1800
453
Positions affording facilities for crossing
454
Effect of increased width of the river
455
General rules for effecting a passage
456
Advantages of a point on the commanding bank for crossing
457
Napoleons successful passage of the Danube
458
Construction of bridges and batteries preparatory
459
Influential points for facilitating the passage
460
Seizure of a defensible point upon the opposite shore
461
Passage of the Douro by Wellington
462
Observations on the passage
464
Passage of the Garonne at Toulouse
465
Passage below Toulouse
467
PAR PAGE
468
Directing the line of operation
470
Determining the choice
473
CHAPTER III
474
Object of a pursuit 429
476
12
479
Sanitary position for camps
483
Objects of outposts 489 4 Tellingoff and placing the advanced posts 490
490
Pushing posts forward
491
Strengthening outposts 492 10 Obstacles to prevent surprise
492
Protection of flanks
493
Distances of videttes
494
Number and disposition of troops
495
Composition of troops for outpost duty
496
Principle to be observed
497
Prussian outposts in Waterloo campaign
498
Fires and posting videttes at night
499
Relieving the pickets
500
CHAPTER V
502
Real and false attacks
503
How to deal with an abattis
504
Sorties from houses
510
General rules
516
PAR PAGE 12 Marmonts plan for quelling the insurrection in 1830
518
Its want of mutual cooperation
519
Attack on the Tulieries repulsed
520
Observations on the attack
521
Active measures against houses
522
Paris divided into districts by Cavaignac
523
Defence of Saragossa
524
Means adopted by the defenders for delaying their assailants
525
Probable reasons for the success of the French
526
CHAPTER VII
528
Turenne surprised by Condé
529
Artificial cover
530
Supply of tools for obtaining cover
531
Slight preparation of the ground previous to the battle of the Alma
532
Marlborough at Donauwerth 15 Neglect of intrenching at Albuera
533
537542
537
Waterproof sheet trail flying and swing flying bridge
544
Their direction
549
225
557
Connection between points and lines
564

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Page 323 - ... bent on the dark columns in their front ; their measured tread shook the ground ; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation ; their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot, and with a horrid carnage, it was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hilL...
Page 410 - In Sir John Moore's campaign," said the Duke of Wellington, " I can see but one error : when he advanced to Sahagun, he should have considered it as a movement of retreat, and sent officers to the rear to mark and prepare the halting places for every brigade.
Page 158 - I made signal to withdraw from action, intending to resume the attack the next morning. During the evening the commanding officers of the iron-clads came on board the flag-ship, and, to my regret, I soon became convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force under my command. No ship had been exposed to the severest fire of the enemy over forty...
Page 323 - Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke, and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy's heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory : they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from their artillery whistled through the British ranks.
Page 345 - The fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is to know how to take the offensive at a proper time, and to take it. Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo. Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the...
Page 202 - Army Corps, the command aggregating 23,000 men — accompanied by its artillery, trains, animals, and baggage — from the Rapidan, in Virginia, to Stevenson in Alabama, a distance of 1,192 miles in seven days, crossing the Ohio river twice. 2. The transfer of the...
Page 323 - Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their order, their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as slowly and with a horrid carnage it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the...
Page 540 - In other cases sand is unhealthy, from underlying clay or laterite near the surface, or from being so placed that water rises through its permeable soil from higher levels. Water may then be found within three or four feet of the surface ; and in this.
Page 464 - Some of the citizens now passed over to Villa Nova, with several great boats ; Sherbrooke's people began to cross in large bodies, and at the same moment a loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy had abandoned the lower part of the city ; and now also Murray's troops were seen descending the right bank from Avintas.
Page 228 - ... that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of battles.

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