Corporate Governance: Essays in Honor of Horst Albach
Horst Albach, Joachim Schwalbach
Springer, 2001 - Business & Economics - 203 pages
Corporate Governance is a subject of great interest to academics, investors, and politicians throughout the world. Corporate governance is associated with the way firms are managed and controlled. Countries have adopted different governance systems to resolve the corporate governance issues. Anglo-Saxon systems differ from European and Japanese systems, and Eastern Europe and China, for instance, experiment with the way private organizations should be governed.
Despite the great interest and intense debate, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of various governance systems is still sparse. This book brings together most current contributions from various perspectives and from an international angle. The book is an essential reading for academics, university students, practitioners, investors, politicians, and legislators.
89 pages matching Joachim Schwalbach in this book
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Corporate Governance in Transnational Companies
Corporate Investors and Firm Control
4 other sections not shown
accounting standards activities Albert Frere American assets average become business schools capital markets civil-law co-determination Committee common-law countries company law compensation contracts corporate finance corporate governance corporate law costs creditor rights Daimler-Benz DaimlerChrysler decisions Deutsche Bank directors dividend economic Edzard Reuter effects efficient empirical employee sovereignty enforcement Engwall equity European executives exercise price French-civil-law countries German German-civil-law Giovanni Agnelli global grant human capital human capitalists important incentives increase industry institutional investors interests investment investor protection Japan Japanese firms labor legal families legal rules long-term major Management Board managerial means meeting merger minority shareholders Nokia owners ownership concentration Paul Desmarais performance principal-agent problem private benefits problem production profits returns risk role secured creditors shareholder rights shareholder value shares Shleifer significant Stefan Winter stock corporation stock market stock option plans stockholders STOP's strategy Supervisory Board threat point top management variable Vishny workers