Communication and Meaning: An Essay in Applied Modal Logic
This essay contains material which will hopefully be of interest not only to philosophers, but also to those social scientists whose research concerns the analysis of communication, verbal or non-verbal. Although most of the topics taken up here are central to issues in the philosophy of language, they are, in my opinion, indistinguishable from topics in descriptive social psychology. The essay aims to provide a conceptual framework within which various key aspects of communication can be described, and it presents a formal language, using techniques from modern modal logic, in which such descriptions can themselves be formulated. It is my hope that this framework, or parts of it, might also turn out to be of value in future empirical work. There are, therefore, essentially two sides to this essay: the development of a framework of concepts, and the construction of a formal language rich enough to express the elements of which that framework is composed. The first of these two takes its point of departure in the statement quoted from Lewis (1972) on the page preceding this introduction. The distinction drawn there by Lewis is accepted as a working hypothesis, and in one sense this essay may be seen as an attempt to explore some of the consequences of that hypothesis.
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SIGNS AND SIGNALLING
Sign Systems and the Possibility of Deceit
A FORMAL LANGUAGE
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a's action a's beliefs a's interest according act-types adopted agent individual analysis assigned audience b's act Bateson behaviour belief of type believes that q Bennett Chapter characterization circumstances communication situation concerned convention of truthfulness deontic Deontic Logic described double bind enquiring system Epimenides essay example fact fc's formal formal language function Gregory Bateson Gricean grounds Hintikka III.l indicative language individual constant symbol information available intends interrogatives kind language language-game Lewis Lewis's LISS Logical Types means that q metacommunicative modal logic Moore's paradox mutual beliefs non-deceiving performance non-indicatives normative relation notion optimal paradox philosophy of language Porn possible worlds provably q is true Q.Ser Q+(w R(Da relevant reliable role rule of information schizophrenic Section sentence signalling act signalling actions signalling problem specification speech act suppose takes theory tion truth conditions truth value truthfulness and trust utterance valid