Institutes of metaphysic: the theory of knowing and being (Google eBook)

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W. Blackwood, 1856 - Knowledge, Theory of - 543 pages
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Contents

Explanation continued First principles always come out last
12
Illustrations of this from language and grammar
13
Illustration continued H 21 Illustration from logic
15
Application to philosophy Here too first principles come out last
16
These principles though operative in philosophy are unnoticed and
24
known 17
349
How ill the necessary truths have fared In Germany and in our own country
24
Secondly How Is the unsatisfactory state of philosophy to be remedied ? Short answer
26
A remedial system uniting truth and reason not impossible
28
This system of Institutes claims both truth and demonstration but rather demonstration than rrui h
29
It is a body of necessary truth Its pretensions stated
30
An objection tois method stated and obviated
31
Why philosophy must be polemical She exists only to correct the inad vertencies of ordinary thinking
32
This might be abundantly proved by the testimony of philosophers
33
The charge of disrespect which might be supposed to attach to philosophy on account of her polemical character obviated
34
What philosophy has to do again distinctly stated
36
Why philosophy undertakes this object
38
How philosophy goes to work Adherence to canonproposition and counterproposition
39
Further explanations as to how philosophy goes to work
40
Advantages of this method
41
General unintelligibility of systems is due to their neglect to exhibit this contrast
42
This system contrasts distinctly the true and the false
45
54 The section called ontology naturally comes firstbut is truly last in order
46
It must be made to revolve away from us in order to bring round the epistemology which though it naturally comes last is truly first in order
47
Epistemology and ontology the two main divisions of philosophy
49
Because Absolute Existence may be that which we are ignorant of
50
Now we can settle the problem of ontologyand how
51
Recapitulation of the three sections 1 Epistemology 2 Agnoiology 3 Ontology This arrangement not arbitrary but necessary
52
The natural oversights of thought are rectified in these three sections
53
PROPOSITION I
79
PROPOSITION II
97
PROPOSITION III
105
Further illustration
11
Short statement of what this proposition contends for
18
PROPOSITION IV
121
Orservations and Explanations
122
Oversight of self only apparentnot real and total
123
Psychological materialism as founded on the four counterpropositions
124
A preliminary question prejudged hy materialist and hy idealist 12f 9 Cause of this precipitate judgment Its evil consequences
127
How Prop IV decides this preliminary question How Counterpro position IV decides it
128
Symbols illustrative of the position maintained hy the Institutes 12K 12 The same symbols as illustrative of the psychological position
129
Different conclusions from the two positions ISO 14 Difference farther explained
131
Another point of difference between this system and psychology
132
Matter per tr reduced to the contradictory
134
k 18 But to matter per s e itself
137
Advantage of this reduction New light on the problem of philosophy
139
Importance of finding the contradictory
140
In what sense the contradictory is conceivable
141
Matter per ss is not a nonentity
142
PROPOSITION V
144
Fith Counterproposiiion
145
Distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter in 4 Character of the secondary qualities Jfi 5 Character of the primary qualities
149
It runs into a contradiction
151
Psychological conception of idealism
152
This refutation if logically conclusive is founded on a contradiction and therefore cannot be accepted
154
The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be aban doued as useless or worse
155
PROPOSITION VI
156
PROPOSITION
196
The ego is coextensive with the universal matter is not coextensive with
2
the particular element
198
The oversight accounted for Effect of familiarity
200
We study the strange rather than the familiar hence truth escapes us
202
Hence neglect of this proposition
204
Another circumstance which may have caused the neglect of this propo sition
206
Epistemological generalisation is very different
207
The ego not a mere generalisation from experience 20
210
The second clause of proposition has had a standing In philosophy from the earliest times
213
Demur as to matter being the fluctuating in existence
214
It is certainly the fluctuating in cognition
215
explained
217
A hint as to its fluctuation in existence
218
explained 21
219
Corrective illustration
221
Psychology adopts Counterproposition VII
223
PROPOSITION VTII Thk Ego in Cognition
224
Orservations and Explanations
226
Materiality and immateriality Eighth Counterproposition
227
Eighth counterproposition the common property of materialist and spiritualist
228
Early conception of mind as material Ghosts clairvoyance spirit rapping
229
Conception of mind as material substance dismissed
231
The spiritualists conception of mind Is as null as the materialistis
232
Both parties hold mind to be particular
233
It is known only as the universal
234
The materialistis error consists In his holding mind to be particular
11
The spiritualists error consists in his holding mind to be particular
12
The two errors summed
13
Recapitulation of the institutional proof of immateriality
14
The Eoo per se
241
Orservations and Explanations
242
Objection obviated
243
David Hume outgoes this proposition
245
Another objection obviated
255
PROPOSITION X
257
Orservations and Explanations
258
Tenth Counterproposition
259
Comment on the translation here given of the counterproposition
260
The counterproposition is equally contradictory whether accepted without or with a restriction
261
The antisensual psychology merely restricts the counterproposition leaves the contradiction uncorrected
263
The root of the mischief History of distinction between sense and intellect
264
PROPOSITION XI
290
PROPOSITION XII
300
PROPOSITION XIII
310
PROPOSITION XIV
321
PROPOSITION XVI
328
The position of natural thinking in regard tothi s proposition
331
2
332
Its downfall
333
This definition is due to Spinoza
334
PROPOSITION XVII
335
Orservations and Explanations
336
Conglomerate character of the counterproposition
337
33y 5 The counterproposition considered in so far as It is the product of natu ral thinking
340
The exact point in the counterproposition which natural thinking op poses to the proposition
341
B Psychological opinion as to existing substance
342
Secondly It places before us the mere phenomenal
343
The institutional conception of known substance
344
Errors caused hy this reversal
346
Substance and phenomenon originally bore the signification assigned to them here
347
The known phenomenal according to the older systems
348
A word upon existing substance and phenomenon 34
350
These ambiguities accounted for
351
And cleared up hy a reference to the Institutional doctrine
352
Coincidence of the old speculations with the Institutes
353
An objection obviated
354
Mistakes of the historians of philosophy as to substance
355
A traditional dogma about disdaining the senses 35
357
What the ancient philosophers meant by this dogma
359
Contrast between speculation and psychology in their views of substance and phenomenon
360
PROPOSITION XVIII
363
PROPOSITION XIX
367
PROPOSITION XXI
373
PROPOSITION XXII
384
PROPOSITION I
405
PROPOSITION III
412
PROPOSITION IV
417
PROPOSITION VI
428
PROPOSITION VIII
224
PROPOSITION I
453
PROPOSITION II
97
PROPOSITION III
464
PROPOSITION VI
472
PROPOSITION VIII
224
What Arsolute Existence is hot
477
PROPOSITION IX
479
Question as to the origin of knowledgehas been erroneously treated 4MI 2 The assumption which vitiates the discussion 411
485
his Vision of all things in God 4S7 11 Leibnitz his Preestablished Harmony 4S 12 Character of these hypotheses 48
489
his doctrine of intuitive perception
490
His fundamental defect 41
494
He mistook the vocation of philosophy 4M 20 Kant Innate Ideas
497
The misconception to be particularly guarded against
499
This misconception has never been guarded against hy any philosopher
500
In this controversy Kant is as much at fault as his predecessors
502
How this system of Institutes avoids these errors 5114
504
it finds that all cognition consists of two elements
505
it finds that matter is only a hatcognition
506
it steers clear of spurious idealism 507
35
The synthesis of ego and nonego Is original and not factitious
36
secondary
510
PROPOSITION X
511
What is Truth ? 3 All Existence is the synthesis of the universal and the particular 4 Thus the equation of the Known and the Existent has been prove...
512
Illustration of restrictionWhat the ontology gives out as alone Abso lute Existence 8 This paragraph qualifies a previous assertion 9 In what sense we ...
517
PROPOSITION XI
522
Orservations and Explanations
523
The system is forced to this conclusion
525
Summary and Conclusion
526
The main question isHow has the system redeemed its pledges? 52ft 2 It is submitted that the system is both reasoned and true
527
Its negative character is to be attended to principally
528
The next step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character
529
S The second contradiction which it corrects
530
The third contradiction which it corrects
531
The sixth contradiction which the epistemology corrects
532
The seventh contradiction which it corrects
533
The ninth contradiction which it corrects
534
The tenth contradiction which it corrects
16
The eleventh twelfth and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects
535
The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects
536
The derivative contradictions which it corrects
537
The opinions entertained hy natural thinking and to some extent hy psychology on the subject of Being
538
Exposure and refutation of these contradictions 53
539
The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects 5411
540
By the correction of these contradictions the system has redeemed its pledge
541
The utility of philosophical study 511
542

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Page 97 - The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, object plus subject ; thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition ' a various wording of the general doctrine.
Page 245 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 95 - Hegel, but who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel ? Not any of his countrymen, not any foreigner, seldom even himself. With peaks, here and there, more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere, or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe.
Page 522 - All absolute existences are contingent except "one; in other words, there is One, but only " one, Absolute Existence which is strictly " necessary ; and that existence is a supreme " and infinite and everlasting Mind in synthesis
Page 13 - Krofprin- stance, that no inquirer has ever yet got to tha pies always * come out beginning ; and this, again, is to be accounted for by a fact for which no man is answerable, but which is inherent in the very constitution of things the circumstance, namely, that things which are first in the order of nature are last in the order of knowledge. This consideration, while it frees all human beings from any degree of blame, serves to explain why the rudiments of philosophy should still...
Page 28 - Affirm nothing except what is enforced by reason as a necessary truth that is, as a truth the supposed reversal of which would involve a contradiction ; and deny nothing, unless its affirmation involves a contradiction that is, contradicts some necessary truth or law of reason.
Page 384 - the senses are only contingent conditions of knowledge; in other words, it is possible that intelligences different from the human (supposing that there are such) should apprehend things under other laws, or in other ways, than those of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling ; or more shortly, our senses are not laws of cognition or modes of apprehension which are binding on intelligence necessarily and universally.
Page 84 - I' is the object of intel" lect alone. We are never objects of sense to ourselves. A man "can see and touch his body, but he cannot see and touch "himself. When the cognizance of self is laid down as the " condition of all knowledge, this of course does not mean that " certain objects of sense (external things, to wit) are apprehended " through certain other objects of sense (our own bodies, namely), " for such a statement would be altogether futile.
Page 8 - One man is playing at chess, his adversary is playing against him at billiards ; and whenever a victory is achieved or a defeat sustained, it is always such a victory as a billiard-player might be supposed to gain over a chess-player, or such a defeat as a billiard-player might be supposed to sustain at the hands of a chess-player.
Page 230 - Te who make shattered nerves and depraved sensations the interpreters of truth, the keys which shall unlock the gates of heaven, and open the secrets of futurity ye who inaugurate disease as the prophet of all wisdom, thus making sin, death, and the devil, the lords paramount of creation have ye bethought yourselves of the backward and downward course which ye are running into the pit of the bestial and the abhorred? Oh, ye miserable mystics! when...

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