The Unity of Understanding: A Study in Kantian Problems
This is an analysis of Kant's account of human understanding--of our capacity to form concepts of, and to be conscious of, things in the world. Schwyzer argues that the conditions which Kant sets forth for understanding--conditions about the autonomy of thought, and about the relation of concepts to objects and of language to experience--cannot be satisfied within his overall picture of understanding as representing something to oneself. If Kant's conditions are to be satisfied, Schwyzer argues, understanding must be seen not as a capacity for mental representation, but as a capacity for action.
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How are Concepts of Objects Possible?
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able acceptance of rules account of concept act of synthesis actions analytic unity apperception apply argued awareness of rules behaviour Bennett capacity ceteris paribus Chapter claim Clue coherent communicability concept possession connection crucial data of sensibility Descartes duality empiricism empiricist essentially example explanation express fact first-person for-me factor functions of unity given Guyer idea implicit infinite regress intentional consciousness intentional object intuition involves Jonathan Bennett judging judgment forms Kant Kant's account Kantian kind language-game logical form logical functions mastery merely mind nature ness objects of consciousness oneself P. F. Strawson pain possible practice present presupposes proposition public language question representations rule-following rule-governed Schematism sciousness seems self-consciousness sense sensorily affected sensory sentences sentience simply somehow someone sort spontaneous suppose Table of Judgments thesis things thought thought-element tion Transcendental Deduction turn right unity of consciousness unschematized category utterance Wittgenstein