Global Anti-realism: A Metaphilosophical Inquiry
Few philosophical debates have generated as much interest - or as much confusion - over the last several decades as those over realism and anti-realism. In Global Anti-Realism, Andrew Cortens imposes some much needed order on the field by arguing that realist/anti-realist debates of all kinds display a common structure. While realists think of themselves as believing the claims expressed by a certain range of sentences, anti-realists refuse to accept the sentences as interpreted by their opponents. They either accept the realist interpretation while rejecting the relevant sentences, or endorse the sentences under some alternative interpretation.Cortens extends this simple model for understanding so-called "local" disputes over realism in areas like morality, causality, and mathematics in order to formulate a clear conception of a "global" dispute over realism and anti-realism.The author argues that recent analytic philosophy is rife with disputes of this kind, focusing on three areas in particular: (i) disputes over whether it is we who in some sense "divide the world up into objects", (ii) disputes over whether there are any privileged reference relations between words and things, and (iii) disputes over whether talk of linguistic meaning and mental content answers to anything in reality. Contrary to what is commonly thought, epistemic and deflationary conceptions of truth have at best a tenuous connection with global anti-realism, Cortens argues.By meticulously revealing the global ramifications of views associated with Putnam, Quine, Kripke's Wittgenstein and others, Global Anti-Realism promises to reshape our understanding of realist/anti-realist debates and makes a forceful case for the profound metaphysical significance of current controversies in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. The work concludes with some recommendations for how realist/anti-realist debate should proceed in the future.
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Local And Global
AntiRealism about Reference and Global AntiRealism
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anti-realism about reference anti-realist about reference applies argument assert Berkeley Boghossian Chapter claim committed conception content anti-realism content anti-realist correct count deflationism deflationist describing reality Devitt Dummett eliminativism endorse English1 entails entities epistemic epistemic theorist error theorist ethical exists external perspective fact global anti-realism global anti-realist global object anti-realism Hilary Putnam indeterminacy Indeterminacy of Translation Inwagen Jonathan Bennett matter meaning mereological sums metaphysical picture Michael Devitt Michael Dummett nihilism nominalist non-cognitivism non-cognitivist object anti-realist object-talk ontological commitment ontologically serious ontologically unserious perspicuous Peter van Inwagen phenomenalist physical objects pluralism position predicate proposition Putnam qua philosopher question Quine Quine's realist reductive nihilist reference schemes refers to cats regard relativism semantic sense sentence Snow is white someone Sophisticated Believer sort statemental anti-realist suggests suppose talk tence term theory of truth thesis things tion translation manual true or false truth conditions unperspicuous utterances W.V. Quine