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Timothy J Kehoe David K Levine Andreu MasColell and Michael
Drew Fudenberg and David K Levine An Approximate Folk Theorem
Cotter Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Type
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1991 by Academic adopted agent of type asset assume assumption best allocation characterization concave consider constraints consumers consumption continuous converges convex correlated correlated equilibrium corresponding cost function cost share equilibrium cost sharing method defined definition denote differentiable discount dynamic Econ Econometrica economy endowment equi equilibrium allocations equivalent example exists feasible fiat money finite firms follower's cost given gross substitutability Hence implies indifference curve innovation Kamien Lemma librium Lindahl Lindahl equilibrium linear cost share martingale martingale measure maximization mechanism minimax monetary equilibrium monotonic Nash equilibrium non-benevolence non-malevolence old agent overlapping generations model paper Pareto optimal payoff payoff matrix period player preferences problem production proof of Theorem Proposition punishment result Section semiorder sequence social choice rule solution stationary stochastic strategy profile strictly subgame perfect equilibrium subset sufficient conditions Suppose Theory tion transversality condition unique utility function vector young agent zero