The Methods of Ethics

Front Cover
Hackett Publishing, Jan 1, 1981 - Philosophy - 528 pages
1 Review
The Methods Of Ethics (Seventh Edition)by Henry Sidgwick. Foreword by John Rawls
  

What people are saying - Write a review

User Review - Flag as inappropriate

This book renders a wonderful exposition with lucid analysis that covers most of the issues of ethics. Not only is it useful for a newbie, but also for one who has come a long way from that position, to deal with the serious ethical issues of the time. Even it can be taken as a point of departure for whom who is ready to mingle with the issues related to the applied ethics, i.e., the problems discussed in Business Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Medical Ethics etc.
Biswanath Swain
Research Scholar in Philosophy
Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur
biswanath80@gmail.com
 

Review: The Methods Of Ethics

User Review  - Chris - Goodreads

All ethical argumentation ultimately reduces to reasoning about happiness. Sidgwick is persuasive to an impressive degree, but not absolutely. Are preferences conducive to happiness really always ... Read full review

Contents

CHAPTER I
1
If however we include the Moral Sentiments among these motives
2
still it is impossible to roe in acting not to regard myself as free
3
or when circumstances have materially altered since it was made
8
The notion expressed by ought in its strictest ethical use is
22
ETHICS AND POLITICS
35
If by pleasure is meant agreeable feeling this doctrine
42
as is further shown by the occasional conflict between the two kinds
51
as claims may conflict bat clearly binding rules cannot be obtained
246
and the wider duties of Neighbourhood Citizenship Universal
254
Justice is especially difficult to define The Just cannot be identified
264
and this social order may itself from another point of view be con
271
But at any rate the primary object of Ethics is not to determine what
278
Nor does the realisation of Freedom satisfy our common conception
279
or 111 Desert in order to realise Criminal Justice There remains
290
For we are neither agreed as to what kind of government is ideally
297

CHAPTER V
57
The Kantian identification ofFreeand Rationalaction is mislead
67
7172
71
CHAPTER VI
77
In short all varieties of Method may conveniently be classed under
83
CHAPTER VII
89
CHAPTER VIII
96
stituting for right the wider notion good 105106
105
but
113
BOOK II
119
pleasure being defined as feeling apprehended as desirable by
129
pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived and that a sum
131
that the habit of introspectively comparing pleasures is unfavour
138
that in fact the supposed definite commensurability of pleasures
146
and these judgments when closely examined are found to be per
153
CHAPTER V
162
even if we consider not merely
170
176180
176
or biological 190192
190
CHAPTER 1
199
It is certainly an essential condition that we should not believe
207
The existence of apparent cognitions of right conduct intuitively
214
VIRTUE AND DUTY
217
It may be said that Moral Excellence like Beauty eludes defini
228
A similar result is reached by an examination singly and together
243
The duty of fulfilling a promise in the sense in which it was under
304
CHAPTER VII
312
CHAPTER VIII
320
SELFREGARDING VIRTUES
327
CHAPTER X
332
The maxims of Wisdom and Selfcontrol are only selfevident in
343
and as for the group of principles that were extracted from
349
and even the Duty of Good Faith when we consider the numerous
362
PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM
373
Still there are certain abstract moral principles of real importance
379
which needs for its basis a selfevident
389
What is ultimately good or desirable must be Desirable Consciousness 395397
395
and also from any psychological theory as to the nature
411
CHAPTER II
418
We may observe first that Dispositions may often be admired
426
and in the case of other virtues 448460
448
On the Utilitarian view the relation between Ethics and Politics
457
At the same time it seems idle to try to construct such a code
467
CHAPTER V
475
THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE THREE METHODS
496
The Religious Sanction if we can show that it is actually attached
503
APPENDIX ON KANTS CONCEPTION OF FREE WILL
511
INDEX 617
517
Copyright

Common terms and phrases

References to this book

All Book Search results »

About the author (1981)

Born at Skipton, Yorkshire, Henry Sidgwick studied at Trinity College, Cambridge University, where he was appointed a fellow in 1859. In 1869 he resigned his fellowship when growing religious doubts led him to decide that he could no longer subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Anglican church (as fellows were required to do). He was subsequently reappointed when the religious requirements were abolished, becoming professor of moral philosophy in 1883 and continuing to teach at Trinity College until his death. Sidgwick was active in many fields: education, classics, literature, political theory, and history as well as philosophy. He was interested in the cause of women's education and was instrumental in the founding of Newnham College for women at Cambridge. Sidgwick's most important contributions to philosophy lie in the field of ethics, and his most important work is Methods of Ethics (1874). In ethical theory, he was a proponent of utilitarianism; he is generally regarded as the third great representative of that position, along with Bentham and John Stuart Mill (see also Vols. 1 and 3). He rejected the empiricism on which earlier utilitarians had grounded their theory and displayed much greater complexity and sophistication in treating the psychology of moral motivation. In political theory, Sidgwick was more conservative than either Bentham or Mill.

Bibliographic information