Following the rules: practical reasoning and deontic constraint
For centuries, philosophers have been puzzled by the fact that people often respect moral obligations as a matter of principle, setting aside considerations of self-interest. In more recent years, social scientists have been puzzled by the more general phenomenon of rule-following, the fact that people often abide by social norms even when doing so produces undesirable consequences. Experimental game theorists have demonstrated conclusively that the old-fashioned picture of "economic man," constantly reoptimizing in order to maximize utility in all circumstances, cannot provide adequate foundations for a general theory of rational action. The dominant response, however, has been a slide toward irrationalism. If people are ignoring the consequences of their actions, it is claimed, it must be because they are making some sort of a mistake.
In Following the Rules, Joseph Heath attempts to reverse this trend, by showing how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate deontic constraint as a feature of rational deliberation. The second involves disarming the suspicion that there is something mysterious or irrational about the psychological states underlying rule-following. According to Heath, human rationality is a by-product of the so-called "language upgrade" that we receive as a consequence of the development of specific social practices. As a result, certain constitutive features of our social environment-such as the rule-governed structure of social life-migrate inwards, and become constitutive features of our psychological faculties. This in turn explains why there is an indissoluble bond between practical rationality and deontic constraint.
In the end, what Heath offers is a naturalistic, evolutionary argument in favor of the traditional Kantian view that there is an internal connection between being a rational agent and feeling the force of one's moral obligations.
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able adaptive unconscious agent argue argument assign behavior beliefs and desires biological Boyd Brandom Cambridge University Press choose claim cognitive commitments conception of rationality consequences conventional morality cooperation cultural David Gauthier decision theory defection deontic deontic constraints Donald Davidson equilibrium Evolution evolutionary example explain fact game theory gene human Humean hyperbolic discount inclusive fitness individuals inference instrumental conception instrumental rationality intentional planning system Joseph Heath judgment kin selection language means mechanism motivational natural norm-conformative normative control one's outcome Oxford particular pattern payoff person philosophers play player possible practical rationality preference principles prisoner's dilemma psychological punishment question rational choice rational choice theory reciprocal altruism regress regress argument Richerson Robert Brandom rules sanctions selection simply skepticism social interaction social norms Sociobiology somatic sort specific strategy structure theorists tion underlying utility function utility-maximizing