Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty YearsA book that ... addresses the singlemost important issue of modern times, 'Danger and Survival' is the most comprehensive political history of the nuclear bomb ever written, a major work encompassing the events from the discover of fission in 1938 to the superpower summitry of 1988 ... Beginning with Franklin Roosevelt's lonely decision that the United States must be first in the field and ending with hopeful judgement that our chance of avoiding nuclear catastrophe is better now ... Bundy gives particular attention to the most dangerous confrontations ... Kurshchev's challenges in Berlin and the Cuban Missile crisis. As John F. Kennedy's assistant for national security, he was intensely engaged in both crises ... He reveals new facts ... In addition ... 'Danger and Survival' closely examines those of other states: the forces that have brought nuclear arsenals to Britain, France, China, and Israel ... We gain new understanding of the motives of Charles de Gaulle, Mao Zedong, and David Ben Gurion ... Has it [the bomb] increased their international power and prestige? Have the Japanese and West Germans suffered politically because they lack the bomb? These are among the questions Bundy explores ... After reviewing the absence of great crices in recent years ... Bundy concludes that this fifty-year history gives reason to believe that with courage and prudence we can continue to reduce nuclear danger, step by step ... |
Contents
How the Americans Went First | 3 |
The Decision to Drop Bombs on Japan | 54 |
The Americans and Their Wartime Allies | 98 |
Copyright | |
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accepted Acheson Acheson-Lilienthal report action agreed agreement allies American argument atomic bomb atomic weapons attack Baruch basic believed Bohr Britain British Bush Byrnes Chinese choice Churchill clear Committee Conant Cuba Cuban Missile Crisis decision defense deployment deterrent discussion Dulles effective effort Eisenhower Eisenhower's Europe force France French FRUS Gaulle German Hiroshima Ibid important Israeli Joint Chiefs Kennedy Khrushchev Kissinger knew later leaders Lilienthal matter McNamara meeting memorandum ment military missile gap Moscow negotiations never nuclear danger nuclear war nuclear weapons October Office Oppenheimer physicists political possible president president's proposal prospect Public Papers Quemoy question reality response risk Robert Robert Kennedy Robert Oppenheimer Roosevelt Russians scientists secret side Smyth report Soviet Union Stalin Stimson strategic Strauss Szilard targets thermonuclear thought threat tion Truman understanding United uranium warheads warning Washington West Berlin White House