Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State (Google eBook)

Front Cover
Cambridge University Press, Jan 13, 2000 - Political Science
0 Reviews
The central question of this book is whether the assignment of government functions to the individual jurisdictions in a federal state can ensure an optimal allocation of resources and a fair income distribution. The analysis thereby gives a new answer to the old question about the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federal state. It shows that fiscal decentralization is a method to disclose the preferences of currently living and future generations for local public goods, to limit the size of the government, and to avoid excessive public debt finance. While the allocative branch of the government benefits from fiscal decentralization, it is difficult to obtain a distribution of incomes that differs from the outcome that the market brings along.
  

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

CHAPTER 2 Locational Efficiency and EfficiencySupporting Tax Systems
27
CHAPTER 3 Perfect Interregional Competition
40
CHAPTER 4 Interregional Tax Competition for Mobile Capital
58
CHAPTER 5 Optimal Structure of Local Governments
88
CHAPTER 6 Incentive Equivalence through Perfect Household Mobility
105
CHAPTER 7 Efficiency and the Degree of Household Mobility
118
CHAPTER 8 Decentralized Redistribution Policy
137
CHAPTER 9 Decentralization and Intergenerational Problems
152
CHAPTER 10 Informational Asymmetry between the Regions and the Center
170
CHAPTER 11 Conclusions
191
References
201
Index
211
Copyright

Common terms and phrases

Bibliographic information