Democracy, Accountability, and Representation
Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, Bernard Manin
Cambridge University Press, Sep 13, 1999 - Political Science - 351 pages
This book examines whether mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.
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What Do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy?
Accountability and Authority Toward a Theory of Political Accountability
Accountability and Manipulation
Party Government and Responsiveness
Democracy Elections and Accountability for Economic Outcomes
The Structure of Government and Accountability
Accountability in Athenian Politics
Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy
Mixing Elected and Nonelected Officials in Democratic Policy Making Fundamentals of Accountability and Responsibility
Situating Democratic Political Accountability
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