Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, First Session, on S. 898 ... June 2, 11, 15, 16, and 19, 1981 |
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Common terms and phrases
access charges advertising amended antitrust areas AT&T basic telephone service basis believe Bell Labs Bell System bill cable cable television CHAIRMAN changes Committee common carrier Competition and Deregulation competitors concern Congress consent decree continue costs customer premises equipment customer-premises equipment customers dominant dominant-regulated carrier economic electronic ENFIA establish exchange access existing facilities Federal Communications Commission fully separated affiliate going information services intercity interconnection interest interexchange service investment issues Joint Board jurisdiction legislation long distance MARBUT marketplace mass media ment monopoly newspapers percent potential private line problem proposed question rates reasonable regulated carrier regulatory revenues rural Section Senator CANNON Senator DANFORTH Senator GOLDWATER separate subsidiary specific statement structure subscribers subsidized surcharges tariff telecommunica telecommunications industry telephone companies terminal equipment tion toll transmission unregulated users Western Electric
Popular passages
Page 310 - The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. 'When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,' says he, 'there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Page 310 - enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.' Again: 'Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the
Page 454 - For the purpose of making available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide telecommunications services with adequate facilities at reasonable charges
Page 314 - of any real property pursuant to [the Act] shall not deprive any state or political subdivision thereof . . . of its civil and criminal jurisdiction in and over such property, or impair the civil rights under the state
Page 308 - of the defendants under Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, entitled, 'An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' commonly known as the Sherman Act, as amended.
Page 310 - branch] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.
Page 312 - will be better off if the injunction is relaxed . . . Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation and with the consent of all concerned.
Page 234 - specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that the petitioner is a party in interest and [that the tariff constitutes a prima facie violation of the provisions of this title]
Page 313 - statute, it will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment. Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling.
Page 314 - of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.