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2—games Abreu best reply CEPR characterize co-operation strategy common discount factor continuation payoffs continuous strategy critical subgame Damme defecting forever defection equilibrium define risk dominance definition deviation efficient equilibria equilibria are strictly equilibrium points equilibrium selection equilibrium strategies exist payoff parameters game theory Harsanyi and Selten Hence i's bicentric prior infinitely repeated discounted Infinitely Repeated Games initial path Lemma Let player linear demand lower bound monotonous restitution punishment mutual strategic risk Nash Nash-products OECD p*hl Pareto frontier Pareto-dominated patient players payoff dominance peer pressure player i's bicentric player plays Prisoners productive workers Proof proposition punishment path tt pure strategies repeated Cournot duopoly repeated PD repeated PD-game repeated Prisoner's Dilemma restitution punishment paths restrict attention Risk dominance applied risk perfect simple strategy strategy equilibrium strategy profile strict co-operation equilibria strictly risk dominated subgame perfect subgame starting supergame susceptible to risk theorem Tit for tat tracing procedure weak equilibrium