The Economics of Transparency in Politics
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007 - Business & Economics - 236 pages
The purpose of this book is to formulate and discuss positive (as distinguished from normative) rational choice models of the advantages and costs of transparency in various areas of public sector activity and to assess what is in effect the social level of obfuscation in politics that results from rational behaviour.
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