The Cambridge Companion to William James

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Cambridge University Press, Apr 13, 1997 - Philosophy - 406 pages
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William James (1842-1910) was both a philosopher and a psychologist, nowadays most closely associated with the pragmatic theory of truth. The essays in this companion deal with the full range of his thought as well as other issues, including technical philosophical issues, religious speculation, moral philosophy and political controversies of his time. New readers and nonspecialists will find this the most convenient and accessible guide to James currently available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of James.
  

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Contents

Pragmatism and introspective psychology
11
Consciousness as a pragmatist views it
25
John Deweys naturalization of William James
49
James Clifford and the scientific conscience
69
Religious faith intellectual responsibility and romance
84
The breathtaking intimacy of the material world William Jamess last thoughts
103
James aboutness and his British critics
125
Logical principles and philosophical attitudes Peirces response to Jamess pragmatism
145
Interpreting the universe after a social analogy Intimacy panpsychism and a finite god in a pluralistic universe
237
Moral philosophy and the development of morality
260
Some of lifes ideals
282
A shelter of the mind Henry William and the domestic scene
300
The influence of William James on American culture
322
Pragmatism politics and the corridor
343
James and the Kantian tradition
363
Bibliography
385

Jamess theory of truth
166
The JamesRoyce dispute and the development of Jamess solution
186
William James on religious experience
214

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Page 4 - To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system.
Page 6 - To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.

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