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Abstract Ideas according to Locke admits Aristotle asserts Berkeley certainty Cicero Complex Idea concerning Human Understanding Condillac connexion Consciousness criticism denied Descartes Disc Diss distinction Empiricism employed enounced Essay concerning Human Experience expression External Faculties Fcap Genesis Happiness Hobbes Ibid Idea of Substance Ideas of Relation Identity Immaterial Innate Ideas Intellectual Intuitive Knowledge Judgment Kant Kantian language ledge Leibnitz Liberty Locke holds Locke tells Locke's Philosophy Locke's system Locke's Theory materials ment merely Metaphysical Moral nature neral Nihilism Nominalist notion Number object opinion Origin of Ideas Paralogism passage perception Philo Plato Polemic against Innate Principles proclaims propositions Qualities of Matter question Rational reality Reason reference regarded Reid rience says Locke sect Sensation and Reflection Sensation or Reflection Sensible Qualities Simple Ideas Sir William Hamilton Soul speculations Speculative Reason Stewart term things Thought tion true truth views words xvii xxiii xxvii
Page 165 - Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature.
Page 45 - It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, Koival (.wouu, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it.
Page 78 - I am thane of Cawdor: If good, why do I yield to that suggestion Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair And make my seated heart knock at my ribs, Against the use of nature?
Page 67 - All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here : in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation.
Page 92 - ... abstraction:" and thus all its general ideas are made. This shows man's power and its way of operation to be much the same in the material and intellectual world. For, the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them.
Page 62 - First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities...
Page 64 - Thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so, growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all.
Page 95 - ... yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.
Page 134 - I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain : can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence ? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that.
Page 21 - The only method of freeing learning at once from these abstruse questions is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects.