Game Theory: An Introduction

Front Cover
Princeton University Press, Jan 6, 2013 - Business & Economics - 396 pages

The definitive introduction to game theory

This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives.

Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them.


  • Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory

  • Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information

  • Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises

  • Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission

  • Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students

  • Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students


 

Contents

Introducing Uncertainty and Time
14
Static Games of Complete Information
41
Rationality and Common Knowledge
59
Nash Equilibrium
79
Dynamic Games of Complete Information
127
Credibility and Sequential Rationality
151
Multistage Games
175
Strategic Bargaining
220
Auctions and Competitive Bidding
270
Mechanism Design
288
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
301
Signaling Games
318
Building a Reputation
339
Information Transmission and Cheap Talk
357
Mathematical Appendix
369
References
385

Static Games of Incomplete Information
239

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About the author (2013)

Steven Tadelis is associate professor and Barbara and Gerson Bakar Faculty Fellow at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a Distinguished Economist at eBay Research Labs.

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