Regulation of Financial Institutions: A Functional Analysis |
Common terms and phrases
additional agent analysis appropriate argument for regulation arise assets associated enterprises assumption assured automobile bank behaviour benefits broker capital claims considered consumption contagion contract customers debtors degree depends deposit deposit-taking institutions deposit-taking intermediaries depositors diversification economy efficient regulation enforcement costs equity establish financial institutions financial intermediaries financial intermediation fixed-value forms of regulation functions of financial gain incentive incurred individual intermediary's portfolio Journal of Finance large number lenders and borrowers liabilities loan marketable securities Milton Friedman misappropriation money users monitoring and enforcement mutual fund intermediaries non-financial firm non-marketable securities number of transactions outcome overcome ownership parties payments intermediaries payments system perform period problem production reduce regulation of financial residual claimant respect risk risky role search costs self-dealing shareholders Shavell specific storehouse intermediary suggests supervision trading partners transactions costs transfer intermediary Type II investors ultimate borrowers ultimate lenders uncertainty verification costs wealth