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abstract according activity actual admit appear application apprehended arise Aristotle ascribe assertion assume assumption attempt Becoming cause Chap complete conceive conception connexion consciousness consequence consists contradiction copula course definite definite series determined direction distinguished effect elements empty enquiry equally essence existence experience explain expression external fact fourth dimension further given Hegel Heraclitus Herbart idea identical immanent impossible impressions independent infinite infinite divisibility instance intelligible Kant law of Identity Leibnitz logical manifold matter means merely metaphysical mind's eye mode Monads Monism motion multiplicity nature necessity object occurrence ontological ourselves perception position possible predicates present presuppose principle principle of Identity produce question realisation reality reason reciprocal action recognise regard relation remains result sense simple quality space spatial subsist supposed supposition take place theory thinkable thought tion transeunt transition truth uniform space unity universal
Page 184 - It will lead directly back to our view that every single thing and event can only be thought as an activity, constant or transitory, of the one Existence, its reality and substance as the mode of being and substance of this one Existence, its nature and form as a consistent phase in the unfolding of the same.
Page 321 - Time is even here really superfluous. The Thesis might just as well assert of Time itself that it must have a beginning, and then proceed as it does. ' For 1 on supposition that Time has no beginning, before any given moment of Time there must have elapsed an eternity, an endless series of successive moments. Now the endlessness of a series consists in this, that it can never be completed by successive synthesis. An endless past lapse of Time is therefore impossible and a beginning of it necessary.
Page 355 - ... and no longer anything at all, and a darkness of the Future, which is also nothing ? ' Even in these expressions, as he truly says, he is yielding to the imaginative tendency which seeks to soften the incredible. ' For these two abysses of obscurity, however formless and empty, would still be there, would still afford a kind of local habitation for the not-being, into which it might have disappeared or from which it might come forth. But let any one try to dispense with these images and to banish...
Page 229 - It is in so far as something is an object to itself, relates itself to itself, distinguishes itself from something else, that by this act of its own it detaches itself from the Infinite.
Page 219 - ... difference between his own conception and that of Hegelianism, a difference extending beyond and lying at the root of the manifest divergence of method. In laying out the matter of metaphysic, Lotze adopts on the whole the method of Herbart, and generally is of opinion "that it is only inquiries conducted in the spirit of realism that will satisfy the wishes of idealism ". But the superficial difference of arrangement only indicates the deeper opposition in which Lotze stands to the Hegelian...
Page 155 - That in the actual passage of events something should actually come to pass, something new which previously was not ; that history should be something more than a translation into time of the eternally complete 1 Rev. Marcus Dods, Ency. Brit. gth edn, sv Predestination. content of an ordered world — this...
Page 165 - They must therefore belong together beforehand, be co-implicated already, their natures must have an inborn mutual reference each to each. Lotze's own solution runs as follows: The multiple independent things supposed cannot be real in that shape, but all of them, if reciprocal action is to be possible between them, must be regarded as parts of a single real being, M. The pluralism with which our view began has to give place to a monism ; and the 'transeunt...
Page 104 - absolute becoming," as it is well said in a quotation he makes from Lotze (ii. 167), cannot be refuted by the logical law of Identity ; " for this only asserts that m is m in case it is, and so long as it is, but whether it is, and whether it must always be if it is once, upon those points the law decides nothing.
Page 220 - As regards the ultimate principles which we follow in this criticism of our thoughts, it is quite true that we are left with nothing but the confidence of Reason in itself, or the certainty of belief in the general truth that there is a meaning in the world, and that the nature of that reality which includes us in itself has given our spirit only such necessities of thought as harmonize with it.