Metaphysic: in three books, ontology, cosmology, and psychology, Volume 1 (Google eBook)

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Clarendon Press, 1887 - Metaphysics
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Contents

No clue to be found in the Dialectic Method
21
No clue to be found in the forms of Judgment
23
Divisions of the subject
27
The natural conception of the universe
29
CHAPTER I
31
Sensation the only evidence of Reality?
32
Sensation gives assurance of nothing beyond itself
33
Being of Things apart from Consciousness Their action on each other
36
Objective relations presuppose the Being of Things
37
Prima facie grounds in favour of Atomism
38
Position and Affirmation meaningless apart from relations
42
Notion of unextended AtomsHerbart
47
Herbarts indifference of Things to relations inconsistent with
49
Herbarts conception of the essence of a Thing as a simple
56
The common element in sensations of colour
64
If there are Things they must be capable of change as
71
TABLE OF CONTENTS xv
75
Real Relations are the reciprocal actions of Things conditioned
82
A Law need not be General?
89
What is that which conforms to the Law?
93
Danger of the antithesis between the world of Ideas and Reality
95
Difficulty of expressing the notion of a Law or Idea which is naturally real
98
CHAPTER IV
100
How is change subject to certain limits to be conceived?
101
Law 6f Identity does not even prove the continuous existence of Things
102
Resolution of all permanence into Becoming
105
Svvafus and ivipyeia in two senses
106
Why are consequences realised?
108
The Things must such realisations
110
This would only explain development not causation
113
In transeunt action changes in the agent must be noticed by the patient
114
Immanent action usually assumed as obvious
115
Notion of Becoming compared with notion of states of a persistent Thing
116
Matter as imparting reality to Qualities
119
Degrees of Intensity of Being
120
CHAPTER V
123
Cause Reason and the Relation which initiates action
125
Modification of Causes and Relation by effect
127
Occasional Causesand Stimuli
128
Must the relation which initiates action be contact? 131
131
A causa transiens is only preliminary to action
134
Difficulty of conceiving the passage of a force or state from AtoB
136
Mechanical view indispensable but not exhaustive
137
Purpose implies a subjectGod the soul
138
Von Baer on purpose in Nature
141
Unity of world determines all modes of action
144
The mechanical order need not exclude progress MS 234 Is there a fixed number of Natural Kinds?
150
Criticism of the question Is real existence finite or infinite? 15J 236 Development of the Cosmosonly its general principles a question for Metaphysic
157
Actual development of life a question for Natural History
158
Conclusion
160
CHAPTER VI
163
Reasons for the belief in a Soul 1 Freedom is no reason
165
Mental and physical processes disparate
166
Disparateness no proof of separate psychical substance
168
Unity of Things analytically involved in reciprocal action
169
Unity of the conscious Subject
171
The subject in what sense called substance
176
Reality subject to Law of Identity in form but not in fact
178
77
179
What the Soul is and the question of its immortality
180
Origin of the Soul may be gradual
182
Relations between the contents of ideas can only exist
186
Interaction between Body and Soul
187
81
189
Idea of a bond between Body and Soul
190
250 The Soul not a resultant of physical actions
191
by the unity which includes them
192
We have not to account for the origin of Motion
194
Consciousness and Motion in Fechners PsychoPhysik
195
The assumption of Motion is not the same thing as the assumption of Life as spiritual existence
197
The dominant principles of any real world are prescribed by its nature and are not prior to it
198
The reference to any real world other than that which exists is imaginary and illustrative
200
Consistency of causation has no meaning apart from the comparison of cases within the actual world
202
Hegel Schelling WeisseNecessity and Freedom
204
Adeqnate and inadequate stimuli of sense
206
The connexion of various classes of sensation
207
Necessity as an appearance produced within reality Ideal ism and Realism
208
The Idea must have a concrete content 20S 91 The Phases of the Idea must be causally connected
210
Hypotheses as to the reason of Webers Law
212
The Idea generates a mechanical system by which it is realised
213
The socalled chemistry of ideas
214
Realism recognises the necessity of regressive interpretation
216
The disappearance of ideas from consciousness The check ing of ideas
217
Subjectivity in relation to the possibility of Knowledge
219
101
233
Psychophysical attempts to explain ideas of relation
234
23S 2 39
236
Herbarts theory of the psychical mechanism
237
The truer view respecting simple ideas and ideas of relation expressed in Herbartian language
240
Finiteness or Infinity of World do not decide the question
241
Attention as an activity of reference
242
Nor does Infinite divisibility of real elements or the reverse
244
Real difficulties What is Space and how are things in it?
246
Reality of Space does not explain its properties
247
Do the points of real Space act upon each other 1
248
Constructions of Space out of active points
251
Constructions of real Space and hypothesis of subjective Space
253
The extraimpression as a clue or local sign
254
Nothing gained by the independent reality of Space J
256
Things in Space on hypothesis of its being subjective
259
Local signs must be conscious sensations
260
Things in an independently existing Space
261
Relations between things and reactions things
263
The movability of things
265
CHAPTER II
267
Schelling on the two factors in Nature and Mind
268
Limit of what can be done by speculative construction Hegel and Weisse
270
Deductions of the three dimensions
271
Three questions involved in Psychological Deductions of Space
273
Alternatives suggested by idea of subjective Space
276
Can any Space represent what our Space will not?
278
Symbolical spatial arrangements of sounds etc
279
No Space will represent disparate qualities
280
Other Spaces than common Space in what sense possible
283
The Soul not omnipresent within the body
284
Geometry dependent on its data
285
All constructions presuppose the Spaceperception
287
It must act directly and independently of Space but only at certain necessary points
288
Constructions of straight line plane etc presuppose them
289
Which these points are is determined from time to time by the activities which go on in them
291
The sum of the angles of a triangle
293
Our ignorance of the special functions of the central nervous organs
295
Dwellers on a spheresurface and parallel lines
297
Analogy from ignorance of third dimension to ignorance of fourth
299
Reproduction of the right concomitant feeling
300
There cannot be four series perpendicular to each other
303
Phrenology
304
The connexion of Consciousness with bodily states
306
Extension must be homogeneous
307
Does memory depend on physical traces left in the brain?
310
Riemanns multiplicities are not Space unless uniform
311
Loss of memory
313
Spatial representations of Time
315
The conception of empty Time
317
The physiological stimulus of sensation 201
318
The connexion of Time with events in it
319
Kants view of Time as subjective
320
Kants proof that the world has a beginning in Time
321
The endlessness of Time not selfcontradictory
322
The past need not be finite because each event is finished
325
An infinite series may be given
327
Time as a mode of our apprehension
329
Empty Time not even a condition of Becoming
330
Origin of erroneous idea that cause and effect must be equal and like 138
333
Time as an abstraction from occurrence
334
Time as an infinite whole is Subjective
335
No mere systematic relation explains Present and Past
336
Indication of Present to a Subject
338
Is Matter homogeneous or of several kinds? 53
340
Subjective Time need not make the Past still exist
341
Absence of real succession conceivable by approximation
343
Even thought cannot consist of a mere succession
346
But Future cannot become Present without succession
348
Empty Time Subjective but succession inseparable from Reality
350
Existence of Past and Future
355
CHAPTER IV
357
Continuity essential to Becoming
359
Grounds for the Law of Persistence
362
The Persistence of Rest
363
The Persistence of Motion
365
Motion inconceivable without Law of Persistence
367
Possibility of absolute Motion on doctrine of real Space
369
Possibility of absolute Rotation
372
Amount and direction of Motion to be accepted like any constant
373
Difficulty of alleged indifference of Things to change of place
375
On view of phenomenal Space percipient subject with or ganism is essential to occurrence of Motion
377
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Page 184 - It will lead directly back to our view that every single thing and event can only be thought as an activity, constant or transitory, of the one Existence, its reality and substance as the mode of being and substance of this one Existence, its nature and form as a consistent phase in the unfolding of the same.
Page 321 - Time is even here really superfluous. The Thesis might just as well assert of Time itself that it must have a beginning, and then proceed as it does. ' For 1 on supposition that Time has no beginning, before any given moment of Time there must have elapsed an eternity, an endless series of successive moments. Now the endlessness of a series consists in this, that it can never be completed by successive synthesis. An endless past lapse of Time is therefore impossible and a beginning of it necessary.
Page 355 - ... and no longer anything at all, and a darkness of the Future, which is also nothing ? ' Even in these expressions, as he truly says, he is yielding to the imaginative tendency which seeks to soften the incredible. ' For these two abysses of obscurity, however formless and empty, would still be there, would still afford a kind of local habitation for the not-being, into which it might have disappeared or from which it might come forth. But let any one try to dispense with these images and to banish...
Page 229 - It is in so far as something is an object to itself, relates itself to itself, distinguishes itself from something else, that by this act of its own it detaches itself from the Infinite.
Page 219 - ... difference between his own conception and that of Hegelianism, a difference extending beyond and lying at the root of the manifest divergence of method. In laying out the matter of metaphysic, Lotze adopts on the whole the method of Herbart, and generally is of opinion "that it is only inquiries conducted in the spirit of realism that will satisfy the wishes of idealism ". But the superficial difference of arrangement only indicates the deeper opposition in which Lotze stands to the Hegelian...
Page 155 - That in the actual passage of events something should actually come to pass, something new which previously was not ; that history should be something more than a translation into time of the eternally complete 1 Rev. Marcus Dods, Ency. Brit. gth edn, sv Predestination. content of an ordered world ó this...
Page 165 - They must therefore belong together beforehand, be co-implicated already, their natures must have an inborn mutual reference each to each. Lotze's own solution runs as follows: The multiple independent things supposed cannot be real in that shape, but all of them, if reciprocal action is to be possible between them, must be regarded as parts of a single real being, M. The pluralism with which our view began has to give place to a monism ; and the 'transeunt...
Page 104 - absolute becoming," as it is well said in a quotation he makes from Lotze (ii. 167), cannot be refuted by the logical law of Identity ; " for this only asserts that m is m in case it is, and so long as it is, but whether it is, and whether it must always be if it is once, upon those points the law decides nothing.
Page 220 - As regards the ultimate principles which we follow in this criticism of our thoughts, it is quite true that we are left with nothing but the confidence of Reason in itself, or the certainty of belief in the general truth that there is a meaning in the world, and that the nature of that reality which includes us in itself has given our spirit only such necessities of thought as harmonize with it.
Page 355 - Present, marching between a darkness of the Past, which is done with and no longer anything at all, and a darkness of the Future, which is also nothing...

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