The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (Google eBook)

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Columbia University Press, 1909 - Neo-Scholasticism - 344 pages
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Page 72 - As all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, it will be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of cause or productive principle.
Page 54 - We have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, ie (of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive) idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we know.
Page 57 - What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body ? but it is vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.
Page 54 - were forced to find out the word substance to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up), but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support
Page 150 - habet viam ad opposita, ut patet in Dialecticis syllogismis, et Rhetoricis persuasionibus: particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia et ideo circa ea judicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est, quod homo sit liberi arbitrii ex hoc ipso, quod rationalis est.
Page 350 - BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS 1 -month loons may be renewed by colling 642 3405 6-month loans may be recharged by bringing
Page 57 - is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.
Page 59 - sensations must be all that we can at bottom mean by their attributes, and the distinction which we verbally make between the properties of things and the sensations we receive from them must originate in the convenience of discourse rather than in the nature of what is denoted by the terms
Page 72 - it will be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of
Page 66 - that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception,

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