16 pages matching public spending in this book
Results 1-3 of 16
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
2's representative Ai(l AJk2 allocation asset prices assume budgetary externality centralization dominates citizen of type concave function cooperative legislature decentralized system decisions decreasing district l's median district l's public district's representative districts are identical elected representatives equilibrium European Central Bank Federal fiscal federalism free-rider problems heterogeneity identical districts implies increasing spillovers inequality ization l's median voter legislature consisting Lemma level of public level of spillovers level of surplus majority preferred types mi(l minimum winning coalition mj(l move district 2's Nash equilibrium Oates order condition performance of centralization Persson player game policy outcome political economy analysis probability 1/2 produces a higher Proof of Proposition provides public good level public goods surplus public spending Representative Democracies representative types Rubinfeld spending levels spillover levels spillovers are large spillovers are small strategic delegation surplus maximizing level surplus maximizing public surplus under centralization surplus under decentralization Torsten Persson under-provided uniform financing