Democratic constitutional design and public policy: analysis and evidence
The variety of constitutional designs found in democratic governments has important effects on policy choices and outcomes. That is the conclusion reached in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, in which the constitutional procedures and constraints through which laws and public policies are adopted—election laws, the general architecture of government, the legal system, and methods for amendment and reform—are evaluated for their political and economic effects. Leading scholars, many of them pioneers in the new field of constitutional political economy, survey and extend recent empirical evidence on the policy effects of different constitutional procedures and restraints. Their findings are relevant not only to such dramatic changes as democratic transition throughout the world and the development of a European constitution but also to the continuing process of constitutional reform in established democracies.
Using the tools of rational choice analysis, the contributors approach the question of constitutional design from public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives. Drawing on empirical evidence largely from the OECD countries, the book analyzes such issues as the policy effects of direct (as opposed to representative) democracy, democratic accountability in presidential as compared to parliamentary government, bicameralism and its relation to stable policies, the relative effectiveness of centralized and decentralized governments, the civil and legal regulatory system as a nation's "economic constitution," and the link between constitutional stability and the amendment process.
John C. Bradbury, Roger D. Congleton, W. Mark Crain, Daniel Diermeier, Lars Feld, Bruno Frey, James D. Gwartney, Randall Holcombe, Hulya Eraslan, Brian Knight, Robert A. Lawson Antonio Merlo, Dennis Mueller, Torsten Persson, Bjorn Erik Rasch, Thomas Stratmann, Alois Stutzer, Birgitta Swedenborg, Guido Tabellini, Stefan Voigt, Barry Weingast
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Designing a Living Constitution
Constitutions and Economic Policy 81
The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments
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amendment analysis bargaining bicameral legislatures budget Bundestag Cambridge capita chambers changes citizens coalition governments committees Congleton constitutional design constitutional reform countries court decisions democratic direct democracy district economic growth effects EFW index elected electoral rules electoral systems empirical equilibrium estimated European European Union evidence expenditures F-statistics facto JI federal federalist Fiscal Federalism formal formateur FPTP GDP growth government duration impact incentives income increase initiatives institutional quality interests issues Journal of Political judicial independence judiciary legislative literature majority Matsusaka median ment Mueller pacts parliament parliamentary democracies parliamentary systems party list percent Persson and Tabellini plurality rule Political Economy political institutions Political Science politicians preferences presidential presidential systems problems proportional representation proto-coalition Public Choice public policies rational choice referenda referendum regression rent seeking representative democracy representatives significant stability tion tional tive unicameral University Press variables vote voters Weingast