Local Dynamics in an Era of Globalization: 21st Century Catalysts for Development

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Shahid Yusuf, Weiping Wu, Simon J. Evenett
World Bank Publications, 2000 - Business & Economics - 179 pages
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Even as globalization annihilates distance and joins countries, pressures for local autonomy and towards urbanization are diffusing economic and political power within countries. These changes are transforming the role of governments and enlarging the involvement of private and nongovernmental participants.'Local Dynamics in an Era of Globalization' is a collection of papers by leading authorities in their fields which discusses some of the major aspects of decentralization and urban change in the context of globalization. These scholars have drawn upon the experiences of developing and industrial countries from every continent.This volume, an outgrowth of the 'World Development Report 1999/2000', offers a wide ranging analysis of key trends over the coming decades with a focus on the Pacific Basin. The papers in this volume, identify and clarify some of the major forces transforming the world economy in the early 21st century.An essential reference for all those interested in of the most important issues of the new millennium. It will be of special interest to policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, economists, and all those working in the international development community.A copublication of the World Bank and Oxford University Press.

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Page 13 - ... trading system adds to the preparedness of countries to become more interdependent. And the third key reason as to why multilateral rules disciplining trade policy are beneficial is that they can help governments ward off domestic interest groups seeking special favours. This comes about partly via Article II, which outlaws the raising of bound tariffs, as well as via numerous other articles aimed at ensuring that non-tariff measures are not used as substitutes for tariffs. This benefit of the...
Page 13 - A's importcompeting producers that A's liberalizing politicians too become net gainers in terms of electoral support. Likewise, politicians in the countries trading with A may well be able to gain from this trade in market access, for equal and opposite reasons. That is, a new opportunity for trade negotiations can stimulate trade liberalization by altering the incentives to lobby politicians and thereby the political equilibrium in trading nations.
Page 13 - Ullyses effect': it helps prevent governments from being tempted, in this case to favour special interest group at the expense of the rest of their economy. While no-one would argue that the GATT rules have been applied without exception, the fact that they are there ensures the worst excesses are avoided. They therefore bring greater certainty and predictability to international markets, enhancing economic welfare in and reducing political tensions between nations. More than that, by promoting interdependence...
Page 99 - Bahl, Roy W., and Johannes F. Linn. "The Assignment of Local Government Revenues in Developing Countries." In: Charles E. McLure, Jr., ed. Tax Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra: Australian National Press, 1983.
Page 13 - ... schedule at specified ceiling levels. This rule is embodied in GATT Article II, whereby WTO members are expected to limit trade only with tariffs and are obligated to continue to provide market access never less favourable than that agreed to in their tariff schedules. Again, the greater certainty which this tariff-binding rule brings to the international trading system adds to the preparedness of countries to become more interdependent and of business people to invest more.
Page 53 - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights...
Page 12 - Second, large economies have the potential to exploit their monopoly power by taxing their trade, but we know from trade theory that the rest of the world and the world as a whole are made worse off by such trade taxes. Thus while each large economy might be tempted to impose trade taxes, the effect of lots of them doing so simultaneously may well be to leave most if not all of them worse off not to mention the welfare reductions that would result in many smaller countries. Hence the value of...
Page 85 - That role would be transferred to the World Bank, The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which are all Northern-controlled.
Page 12 - ... welfare of small and weak nations against discriminatory trade policy actions of large and powerful nations. GATT Articles I (most-favoured-nation) and III (national treatment) promise that all WTO members will be given the same conditions of access to a particular country's market as the most favoured member, and all foreign suppliers will be treated the same as domestic suppliers. These fairness rules are fundamental to instilling confidence in the world trading system. In particular, they...
Page 12 - ... GATT. For example, GATT's product coverage in practice was confined mainly to manufactures (effectively not including textiles and clothing), whereas the WTO encompasses all goods (including now the sensitive farm sector), services, capital to some extent, and ideas (intellectual property). As well, following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the interim GATT Secretariat was converted to a permanent WTO Secretariat with greatly strengthened trade policy review and dispute settlement...

About the author (2000)

Shahid Yusuf, The World Bank. Simon Evenett, The World Bank. Weiping Wu, Virginia Commonwealth University.

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