A theory of nonprofit regulation and firm behavior

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University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1980 - Business & Economics - 596 pages
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Contents

STUDIES OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
31
A THEORY OF NONPROFIT REGULATION AND FIRM
76
IMPLICATIONS OF OUR THEORY OF NONPROFIT
125

4 other sections not shown

Common terms and phrases

across activities administrative costs Alfred Nichols analysis Armen Alchian asymmetric information average capital intensity CD CD ceteris paribus Chapter charity competition concentration ratio conspicuous consumption constraint consumer information costs correlated cost curve cost function Covariance descriptive statistics direct net discretionary budget dummy dummy variables econometric economies of scale Edward Chamberlin efficiency Environmental Protection industry equations equilibrium level estimates exempt organizations expense preference explanatory variables factors of production financial regulation firm age firm expenditures firm failure rates firm revenues firm size firm's for-profit firms for-profit sector function fundraising geographic markets George Akerlof Harold Demsetz Herfindahl Index heteroskedasticity homoskedasticity However hypotheses income redistribution income tax increase information on product input input/output inter-industry Internal Revenue Code Internal Revenue Service John Rafferty LaGrangian multiplier local nonsatiation Los Ange1es marginal cost marginal product marginal utility maximization Medical Research industry Mike Watts model of nonprofit mutual organizations net income Newhouse nonpecuniary returns nonprofit entrepreneurs nonprofit firm behavior nonprofit hospitals nonprofit industries nonprofit institutions nonprofit organizations nonprofit regulation nonprofit sector null hypothesis o o o o objective function offer price oligopoly Oliver Williamson opportunity cost optimal ordinary least squares output level Page Table percent 1eve1 Philip Kotler Philip Nelson positive market predictions private for-profit product quality production function profit-maximizing proportion of revenues purchase quality demands quality level ratios real profits residual claimants revenues spent Robert Carlsson salary San Francisco selling costs selling technique Seven SMSAs Standard errors stringency sumers Susan Kay Table tax-exempt firms Theodore Schultz theory of nonprofit Thus time-series tion trom trust capital umbrella organizations unrelated business activity utility utility function variables variation voluntary voluntary sector Weisbrod WwMp X-inefficiency

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