The Multiple SelfJon Elster The essays in this volume consider the question of whether the self is a unity or whether it should be conceived without metaphor as divided--as a "multiple self." The issue is a central one for several disciplines. It bears directly on the account of rationality and the explanation of individual decision-making and behavior. Is the hypothesis of a multiple self required to deal with the problems of self-deception and weakness of will; and can the conceptual tools developed in the study of interpersonal conflict be applied to the analysis of intra-personal struggle? The essays, by a number of leading philosophers, psychologists, and economists, were all commissioned for this volume. |
Contents
Selfdeception and the voters illusion | 35 |
The goals and strategies of selfdeception | 59 |
Deception and division | 79 |
Deception and selfdeception in Stendhal | 93 |
Selfdeception akrasia and irrationality | 115 |
Beyond microeconomics Conflict among interests in a multiple self as a determinant of value | 133 |
The mind as a consuming organ | 177 |
Goethes Faust Arrows Possibility Theorem and the individual decisiontaker | 197 |
The Buddhist theory of noself | 233 |
| 267 | |
Common terms and phrases
action activities agent Ainslie altruistic Amos Tversky analysis aspects become behaviour belief bhikkhus Buddhist Calvinists causal character choice cognitive cognitive dissonance concept condition consciousness consider consume consumption course daydreams deceived deception decision desire dharmas diagnostic discussed Donald Davidson economic elements Elster evidence example explain fact favourable formation rule Freud function habits harmonic bundles illusion involved irrational irrationality Jon Elster Kolm Lassie Lucien Leuwen Madame de Chasteller matching law maximize mental microeconomics mind motive nirvana Non-aligned Voters norms notion one's oneself outcome pain paradox Pascal's wager person pleasure possible preconscious preference principle private rules problem proposition psychological question rational reason relation requires reward Sartre satisfaction Schelling self-deception and akrasia self-reward sense short-term interest skandhas smoking social social choice theory someone Stendhal strategies subjects suffering sukkha theory things Thomas Schelling tion Type u₁ University Press vote weakness