Politics and International Investment: Measuring Risks and Protecting Profits
In this collection Witold Henisz provides readers with a set of tools for assessing the extent of political and regulatory risk faced by investment projects in a given country. Political risk is measured directly by examining the structure of a nation's political institutions and the preferences of the actors that inhabit them. The author also provides a critical analysis of the effectiveness of one common political risk mitigation strategy, partnering with a local firm.
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List of Figures
Checks and Balances and Credible Commitment
Comparative Economic Organization within and between
7 other sections not shown
analysis Andrei Shleifer asset specificity behavior capital ceteris paribus chapter choice choosing a majority-owned core specification correlated counter-parties Country Risk credible commitment domestic econometric economic growth empirical enforcement executive existing penetration levels expropriation feasibility of policy Foreign Direct Investment Gatignon and Anderson governance branch governance costs growth rates Henisz host-country hypothesis impact increase independent contractual hazards infrastructure penetration institutional environment International Business Studies investors Journal of Economic Journal of International Journal of Law laggard countries legislature level of contractual literature majority-owned plant Management International Review managers market entry mode measure of political minority-owned joint venture multinational corporations opportunistic ownership Oxley party penetration growth percent POLCON policy change political actors political and regulatory political hazards political institutions political risk positive political theory potential predict preferences property rights regime relative sample standard deviation structure theoretical theory transaction cost economics variables veto points Weingast Williamson