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abstraits agree antécédent appears attributs axiomes body c'est-à-dire causation cause chaleur chlorure de sodium chose circonstances circumstances colder coldness conclusion Condillac consciousness conséquent corps courci déduction définition degree deposition of dew dewed différence éléments esprit expérience expérience naturelle experiment fact feelings first found froid que l'air glass great Hegel idées induction inference instances known l'autre l'axiome l'esprit l'expérience l'induction laws lhat logiciens manières d'être mateur ment Method of Difference méthode méthode de concordance méthode de différence méthode des résidus mind mortalité mouvement name nature necessary neral nomène notion opérations phé phénomènes philosophe ployons positions pouvons première preuve primitives prince Albert proposition générale propositions qui concernent propriétés quality raisonnement rence rosée same science scolastique seconde sensations sera seule sition stance state Stuart Mill substance surface syllogisme température texture théorie thing tion tlns true ture vapeur variations concomitantes various vérité word Worlhy of honour
Page 72 - But there still remains the most important case of all, that of nocturnal dew: does the same circumstance exist in this case? 'Is it a fact that the object dewed is colder than the air? Certainly not, one would at first be inclined to say; for what is to make it so? But . . . the experiment is easy ; we have only to lay a thermometer in contact with the dewed substance, and hang one at a little distance above it, out of reach of its influence. The experiment has been therefore made; the question...
Page 104 - The uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise called the law of causation, must be received not as a law of the universe, but of that portion of it only which is within the range of our means of sure observation, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases.
Page 56 - Induction, then, is that operation of the mind, by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, Induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain times will be true in similar circumstances at all times.
Page 63 - The cause, then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows.
Page 59 - Apparently because there is less constancy in the colours of animals, than in the general structure of their anatomy. But how do we know this? Doubtless, from experience. It appears, then, that we need experience to inform us, in what degree, and in what cases, or sorts of cases, experience is to be relied on. Experience must be consulted in order to learn from it under what circumstances arguments from it will be valid.
Page 44 - Thomas, &c., who once were living, but are now dead, we are entitled to conclude that all human beings are mortal, we might surely without any logical inconsequence have concluded at once from those instances that the Duke of Wellington is mortal. The mortality of John, Thomas, and others is, after all, the whole evidence we have for the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. Not one iota is added to the proof by interpolating a general proposition.
Page 59 - Experience must be consulted in order to learn from it under what circumstances arguments from it will be valid. We have no ulterior test to which we subject experience in general; but we make experience its own test. Experience testifies, that among the uniformities which it exhibits or seems to exhibit, some are more to be relied on than others; and uniformity, therefore, may be presumed, from any given number of instances, with a greater degree of assurance, in proportion as the case belongs to...
Page 146 - ... supprimée, un ordre tel que la première appelât la seconde et la seconde la troisième; s'il établissait ainsi que la quantité pure est le commencement nécessaire de la nature, et que la pensée est le terme extrême auquel la nature est tout entière suspendue...
Page 46 - ... being the particular facts from which the general proposition was collected by induction. Those facts, and the individual instances which supplied them, may have been forgotten; but a record remains, not indeed descriptive of the facts themselves, but showing how those cases may be distinguished, respecting which, the facts, when known, were considered to warrant a given inference.
Page 147 - Nous avons élargi les idées anglaises au dixhuitième siècle; nous pouvons, au dix-neuvième siècle, préciser les idées allemandes. Notre affaire est de tempérer, de corriger, de compléter les deux esprits l'un par l'autre, de les fondre en un seul, de les exprimer dans un style que tout le (monde entende, et d'en faire ainsi l'esprit universel.