THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

Front Cover
Harvard University Press, 1965 - Business & Economics - 176 pages
21 Reviews
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mancur Olson examines the extent to which individuals who share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
  

What people are saying - Write a review

User ratings

5 stars
11
4 stars
5
3 stars
3
2 stars
2
1 star
0

Review: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups

User Review  - Sean Rosenthal - Goodreads

Interesting Quotes: "However similar the purposes may be, critics may object that attitudes in organizations are not at all like those in markets. In organizations, an emotional or ideological element ... Read full review

Review: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups

User Review  - Sean Rosenthal - Goodreads

Interesting Quotes: "However similar the purposes may be, critics may object that attitudes in organizations are not at all like those in markets. In organizations, an emotional or ideological element ... Read full review

Contents

A Theory of Groups and Organizations
5
B Public goods and large groups
9
C The traditional theory of groups
16
D Small groups
22
E Exclusive and inclusive groups
36
F A taxonomy of groups
43
Group Size and Group Behavior
53
B Problems of the traditional theories
57
Orthodox Theories of Pressure Groups
111
B Institutional economics and the pressure group John R Commons
114
C Modern theories of pressure groups Bentley Truman Latham
117
D The logic of group theory
125
The ByProduct and Special Interest Theories
132
B Labor lobbies
135
C Professional lobbies
137
D The special interest theory and business lobbies
141

C Social incentives and rational behavior
60
The Labor Union and Economic Freedom
66
B Laborunion growth in theory and practice
76
C The closed shop and economic freedom in the latent group
88
D Government intervention and economic freedom in the latent gorup
91
Orthodox Theories of State and Class
98
B The Marxian theory of state and class
102
C The logic of the Marxian theory
105
E Government promotion of political pressure
148
F Farm cooperatives and farm lobbies
153
G Noneconomic lobbies
159
H The forgotten groups those who suffer in silence
165
Appendix
169
Index
179
Copyright

Common terms and phrases

Popular passages

Page 2 - Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.

References to this book

All Book Search results »

About the author (1965)

Mancur Olson was Distinguished Professor of economics at the University of Maryland and Founder and Principal Investigator of the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS), also based at the University of Maryland.
Satu Kahkonen is Associate Director of IRIS.

Bibliographic information