A simple theory of deregulation
Rohan Pitchford, Australian National University. Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University. Research School of Social Sciences. Economics Program
Faculty of Economics & Commerce, and Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1998 - Business & Economics - 21 pages
11 pages matching cost of manipulation in this book
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1998 William Jack adverse selection agent argument asset value assumed Australian National University choose complementarity or substitutability contract t(ar corner solution cost function cost of manipulation costless manipulability creative accounting deadweight loss decrease degree of substitutability deregulation result direction distort the report endogenous external benefit externality is positive firm's flat incentives forcing contract Holmstrom and Milgrom incomplete contracts indirect effect induce interpretation knife-edge assumptions manager manager's optimization problem manager's problem March 1998 William marginal cost marginal manipulation costs maxu monopoly multi-task literature negative externality non-verifiable optimal regulation output and manipulation perfect substitutes performance measure positive externality present paper principal productive activity profits Proof proposition pure moral hazard real line regulation is optimal regulator wants relatively strong complements Relatively strong substitutability risk averse signal for incentives social Stephen King strong enough complements strong enough substitutes subject to a(x sufficient condition Suppose tasks are perfect theory of deregulation zero