Thunder on the Dnepr: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's BlitzkriegIt has long been thought that the failure of Germany to defeat Russia in 1941 was due primarily to interference in the plans and operations of the German armed forces by Adolf Hitler, and ultimately, that it was Field Marshal "Winter" and General "Mud" that stopped Army Group Center at the gates of Moscow. Certainly, the STAVKA (Soviet High Command) and the Red Army had little or nothing to do with it. But to Dr. Bryan Fugate, this view is too simplistic. A renowned expert on Soviet and German military history - he speaks both German and Russian - Fugate has long understood the great significance of the strategy developed by Soviet Generals Zhukov and Timoshenko that inflicted the devastating casualties on the advancing Nazis, making German victory impossible. This was the foundation of Fugate's previous book, the critically acclaimed and controversial Operation Barbarossa, a landmark study that brought the conventional historians out of their ivory towers into battle. Taking advantage of the new spirit of openness in the former Soviet Union, Fugate visited Russia to investigate precisely how the Soviets were able to outfox both Hitler and his acclaimed generals. In doing so, he teamed up with the eminent Soviet historian Lev Dvoretsky, using the most up-to-date research in formerly secret Soviet military and political archives. The result of this collaboration is Thunder on the Dnepr, a definitive work providing conclusive evidence that despite serious mistakes made by the Germans, the primary reason the Red Army was to prevail was due to war games conducted by Zhukov and Timoshenko in late 1940 and early 1941. The results of these exercises convinced Stalin that the Germans could bedefeated before they reached Moscow, but that existing plans for the Red Army to counterattack immediately when the Germans launched their invasion were futile. Instead, a defense in depth anchored along the Dnepr River on the southern flank of German Army Group Center would slow |
Contents
The War Games of Early 1941 | 45 |
Soviet Preparation for | 77 |
The Race to the Dnepr | 139 |
Copyright | |
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able advance allow already armed armored Army Corps Army Group Center artillery assault attack August battle began beginning believed Bialystok Bock carried chief close combat command continued decision defeat defense destroy direction District divisions Dnepr early east eastern echelon effect encirclement enemy expected fact fighting final forces German given Gomel Guderian guns Halder Hitler important infantry Infantry Division July June Kiev later losses Marshal military mobilization Moscow motorized move northern offensive officers operations organized Panzer Corps Panzer Group Pavlov position possible prepared problem push Red Army reserves result Rifle River Roslavl Russian salient Second sent September side situation Smolensk southern flank Southwestern Front Soviet Union staff Stalin strategy tactics taken tanks Timoshenko tion troops turn Ukraine units USSR Western Front Yelnia Zhukov