The Economics of the Antitrust ProcessM.B. Coate, A. Kleit This book focuses on the antitrust process and how that process affects the efficiency of antitrust law enforcement. The contributors share a wide range of experiences in the antitrust process, including academia, the legal environment, and both private and public sectors. The book deals first with merger activities, followed by non-merger enforcement initiatives and concludes with an examination of the future role of antitrust. |
Contents
Introduction The Economics of the Antitrust Process | |
Overenforcement in the HartScottRodino Second Request Process | 13 |
The Merger Guidelines As Applied | 39 |
Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries | 63 |
The Efficiencies Defense in Merger Cases | 87 |
Buyers Market Power and Market Definition | 115 |
Merger Enforcement at the ReaganBush FTC | 133 |
Winners and Losers in the Settlement of Merger Litigation | 151 |
Efficiency Lost? The Microsoft Consent Decree | 173 |
Predatory Pricing in the Retail Trade The WalMart Case | 193 |
Guilt by Association An Analysis of Nonprice Horizontal Restraint Enforcement | 215 |
| 237 | |
Index | 253 |
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Common terms and phrases
alternative anticompetitive effects antitrust agencies association barriers to entry buyers challenge Coate competitive effects competitors consumer surplus consumers court customers deadweight loss defendant Department of Justice discussed downstream Economics economists efficiencies defense efficiency gains elasticity of demand enforcement agencies estimates evidence Faulkner County Federal Trade Commission free-riding Froeb Horizontal Merger Guidelines incentive Industrial Organization information asymmetries investigation issues Journal Kleit Langenfeld litigation logit manufacturers market definition market delineation market power market shares merged entity merger analysis merger enforcement merger simulations merging firms Microsoft minimum commitments monopolist monopolization MS-DOS nylon textile fiber OEMs oligopoly operating systems output parties percent plaintiff post-merger potential pre-merger predation predatory predatory pricing predict price and welfare price increase procompetitive profits purchasing reduce restraints result retail rivals Scheffman Second Request process settlement significant simulations staff strategies suppliers theory transactions costs typical variable Wal-Mart welfare effects